Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-belyavskiy-rfc5933-bis

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Thu, 18 June 2020 04:07 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 03:53:55 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-belyavskiy-rfc5933-bis
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ships are passing in the night on this topic. GOST is what the russian 
government has to use for its crypto. if GOST is not a standard, then the 
russian federation's government won't be using DNSSEC, or they'll do it with a 
pirated code point. neither of those is desirable and there's no third way.

IETF has not been ruled by good engineering for many years now. the rule for 
publication of a standards document now is, if you want to do "this thing", 
here is a way to do it interoperably.

even known-bad ideas get consensus sometimes. (including some of mine, fwiw.) 
there is nothing particularly bad about GOST. we cannot hold it back based on 
some long-dead ideal Internet System having minimum complexity.

i'm in favour of adoption, and will review.

vixie