Re: [hybi] Extensibility mechanisms?

[Jamie Lokier <[e-mail]>]

Maciej Stachowiak wrote:
> I believe the TLS-based handshake (as proposed by Adam) is more
> robust than solutions involving nonces and challenge/response built
> into an HTTP-like handshake. The reason for this is that it's hard
> for the attacker to control the bytes sent, other than to cause the
> initiation of a TLS handshake, which is something that all network
> services are already exposed to by browsers. The attacker cannot get
> to the next-level protocol running over TLS unless the server
> explicitly opts in. With HTTP-based schemes, it takes much more care
> to avoid sending information as the "wrong" protocol.

Isn't the TLS handshake rather fragile and vulnerable, by virtue of
lots of services sitting behind TLS and using it only to get an
encrypted channel?  If you can open a connection and start TLS, say on
the ftps/imaps or even https port then it's basically unprotected
bytes again after the TLS stage, wrapped *inside* TLS, giving a false
sense of security.

Or is there some extra magic sent in the TLS setup which will be
consistently rejected by non-WebSocket TLS servers?

Thanks,
-- Jamie