Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>]

Hello,

My plan is to re-read the posted draft, but if you plan to include
Stephen's updates as well, I can wait to review that.  I'll have to
read the text to see where we are at as there have been a lot of
messages on this thread and updates from other related AD
comments/disucusses.  I'm still concerned about a few things, but will
see if that matters in the text.

I believe I responded on the heading for the mutual authentication
suggesting that it should really be identifiers and authentication
instead of mutual authentication.  I don't expect to see explicit
guidelines on mutual auth, but with that as the header, I would have.

Thanks,
Kathleen

On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 8:46 AM, Susan Hares <[e-mail]> wrote:
> Juergen:
>
> Thank you for your input.
>
> I can find nothing new in your input that was not covered in the I2RS WG discussions. As far as I can tell you are re-iterating a discussion that occurred in the WG, and was closed.   I have given example (BGP route-view,  web-service up) as events which currently in the public and have been requested by some operators.  Please note that the operator should have a knob that says "always" secure-transport.
>
> Sue
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 6:08 AM
> To: Susan Hares
> Cc: 'Andy Bierman'; 'Lou Berger'; [e-mail]; 'Alissa Cooper'; [e-mail]; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'IESG'; 'Jeffrey Haas'; 'Joel Halpern'; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>
> On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 12:55:53PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote:
>> Andy:
>>
>>
>>
>> The easy of reviewing per leaf – is why I suggested the per leaf.
>>
>> I also agree it is important to mention this non-secure/secure requirement to the PUSH work team we are both on.
>>
>>
>>
>> Should I change:
>>
>> Old: /
>>
>>    A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or
>>
>>    other operational state that was specifically indicated to non-
>>
>>    confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax. /
>>
>> New:
>>
>> /   A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or
>>
>>    other operational state that was specifically indicated to non-
>>
>>    confidential in the data model. /
>>
>
> Tagging something in the data model as 'non-confidential' remains a flawed idea. What can be considered 'non-confidential' depends on the deployment scenario. It is even worse to standardize some piece of information as 'non-confidential'. How can the IETF claim that something is always 'non-confidential'? (And note, a non-secure transport is not just about confidentiality, it also implies that boxes on the path can arbitrarily change the information.)
>
> In case this is not clear: What we have done for ~30 years is to have the decision which information goes into an insecure transport be taken by an access control model. This makes the decision runtime configurable and thus things can be deployment specific. This has worked for 30 years and I have no problem with this. What I am struggling with is the idea to standardize parts of YANG data models as 'non-confidential'.
>
> /js
>
> --
> Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
> Phone: [phone]         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
> Fax:   [phone]         <http://www.jacobs-university.de/>
>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen