Re: [Idr] draft-uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence-00: Security Considerations

Jakob Heitz <jakob.heitz@ericsson.com> Thu, 03 November 2011 03:51 UTC

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From: Jakob Heitz <jakob.heitz@ericsson.com>
To: "erosen@cisco.com" <erosen@cisco.com>, "robert@raszuk.net" <robert@raszuk.net>
Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 23:51:19 -0400
Thread-Topic: [Idr] draft-uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence-00: Security Considerations
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References: Your message of Wed, 02 Nov 2011 23:35:02 +0100. <4EB1C596.5030306@raszuk.net> <14153.1320288579@erosen-linux>
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Cc: "idr@ietf.org List" <idr@ietf.org>, "UTTARO, JAMES" <ju1738@att.com>
Subject: Re: [Idr] draft-uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence-00: Security Considerations
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On Wednesday, November 02, 2011 7:50 PM, Eric Rosen <mailto:erosen@cisco.com> wrote:

>> If we have a below scenario:
>> 
>>           / PE2
>> PE1 -- RR
>>           \ PE3
> 
>> When PE2 disappears RR will re-advertise his routes as persistent to
>> PE1 with some labels - for simplicity let's assume those are L3VPN
>> labels. 
> 
> In the case being discussed (I think), the RR is down at the time PE2
> disappears, but PE1 is still using the routes previously distributed
> to it 
> by the RR.
> 
>> There are two options ...
> 
>> * PE2 went down for good - RR by advertising persistent routes may at
>> most cause to blackhole the traffic - that is why I started by
>> recommending a MUST for next hop reachability
> 
>> * PE2 restarted - here I assume RR would withdraw previous STALE
>> routes by both implicit withdraw and explicit withdraw
> 
> The RR can't withdraw any routes because it is down.
> 
> If PE1 happens to have noticed that PE2 blinked out, it may be wise
> for PE1 
> to invalidate the routes for which PE2 is the next hop.  If PE1 did
> not 
> notice that PE2 blinked out, it will continue to make use PE2's old
> VPN-IP 
> routes.  Unfortunately, all these routes will now have incorrect
> labels, and 
> packets from one VPN may get forwarded by PE2 to another VPN.
> 
> As far as I can tell, until the RR comes back up, there is no
> assurance that 
> PE1 will notice PE2's restart, so random cross-connection of VPNs is
> certainly possible.
> 
> But it's not obvious that random cross-connections of this sort are
> any 
> worse than a complete loss of service.  While datagrams from one VPN
> might 
> get sprayed into the other, it is hard to see how a TCP connection
> between 
> the two VPNs could be set up or maintained, since there is not going
> to be a 
> working reverse path.

I didn't think a stray packet could set up a TCP connection
either. I was wondering if stray packets could cause
disruptions of other kinds. Also, as a customer of a VPN
service, I would not like the possibility of my packets being
sprayed into other VPNs.

-- 
Jakob Heitz.