Re: [Idr] draft-uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence-00: Security Considerations

Eric Rosen <erosen@cisco.com> Thu, 03 November 2011 02:49 UTC

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To: robert@raszuk.net
In-reply-to: Your message of Wed, 02 Nov 2011 23:35:02 +0100. <4EB1C596.5030306@raszuk.net>
Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 22:49:39 -0400
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From: Eric Rosen <erosen@cisco.com>
Cc: "idr@ietf.org List" <idr@ietf.org>, "UTTARO, JAMES" <ju1738@att.com>
Subject: Re: [Idr] draft-uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence-00: Security Considerations
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> If we have a below scenario:
>
>           / PE2
> PE1 -- RR
>           \ PE3

> When PE2 disappears RR will re-advertise his routes as persistent to PE1 
> with some labels - for simplicity let's assume those are L3VPN labels.

In the case being discussed (I think), the RR is down at the time PE2
disappears, but PE1 is still using the routes previously distributed to it
by the RR.

> There are two options ...

> * PE2 went down for good - RR by advertising persistent routes may at 
> most cause to blackhole the traffic - that is why I started by 
> recommending a MUST for next hop reachability

> * PE2 restarted - here I assume RR would withdraw previous STALE routes 
> by both implicit withdraw and explicit withdraw

The RR can't withdraw any routes because it is down.

If PE1 happens to have noticed that PE2 blinked out, it may be wise for PE1
to invalidate the routes for which PE2 is the next hop.  If PE1 did not
notice that PE2 blinked out, it will continue to make use PE2's old VPN-IP
routes.  Unfortunately, all these routes will now have incorrect labels, and
packets from one VPN may get forwarded by PE2 to another VPN.

As far as I can tell, until the RR comes back up, there is no assurance that
PE1 will notice PE2's restart, so random cross-connection of VPNs is
certainly possible.

But it's not obvious that random cross-connections of this sort are any
worse than a complete loss of service.  While datagrams from one VPN might
get sprayed into the other, it is hard to see how a TCP connection between
the two VPNs could be set up or maintained, since there is not going to be a
working reverse path.