Re: Will mailing lists survive DMARC?

Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net> Wed, 30 April 2014 01:37 UTC

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Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2014 21:37:27 -0400
From: Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net>
Organization: Santronics Software, Inc.
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Subject: Re: Will mailing lists survive DMARC?
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On 4/29/2014 7:54 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 3:00 PM, Douglas Otis <doug.mtview@gmail.com
> <mailto:doug.mtview@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     There will be an effort made to better generalize the TPA expired
>     draft. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6541 (ATPS) was hostile to
>     existing mailing-list services and, as such, could not be
>     deployed.  Nor was it more suitable for high volume email
>     services.  An effort to change From header fields will have users
>     guessing which field indicates who authored the message and in the
>     end will provide no benefit.
>
>
> ATPS was deployed as part of an open source package since before it
> was published.  It has seen negligible use, and I suspect that's
> because there has not to date been any demand for third-party signing
> mechanisms of any kind.

Disagree, because you went at it half-hearted. You made it 
experimental and your abstract even stated that it probably means 
nothing. More importantly, Levine and Crocker didn't support the 
effort, so it didn't have a chance at all.

Its call marketing just as it was done with DMARC which is less 
flexible than any other policy system.  If you don't champion it, it 
goes nowhere.

> In any case, ATPS, TPA, and its variants all run up against a
> whitelisting scaling problem.  I think that's the more interesting
> thing to discuss.

It was already discussed. Unless you are sharing this "Whitelist" in 
some centralized fashion, it won't be a persistent and consistent 
protocol solution.  What it will promote is targeted abuse at those 
sites that do not have the same whitelist -- You ware making it so 
that "Batteries Required" in order to function.

We been thru this already.  We need a standard consistent and 
persistent domain based solution all can apply equally and one that 
you don't need to buy "Batteries" to get any payoff.  Even with all 
the "small use cases" belief that is being proven wrong about policy, 
you guys are still in denial about policy.   Everyone is telling you 
guys you got it all wrong, and you still won't listen. This thing will 
never be solved with a status quo.

-- 
HLS