Re: The CIA mentions us

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 14 March 2017 06:42 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: The CIA mentions us
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 08:42:03 +0200
In-Reply-To: <d9b02513-fcb3-888d-8e65-831d1078c24b@riseup.net>
To: willi uebelherr <willi.uebelherr@riseup.net>
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Hi, Willi

> On 14 Mar 2017, at 6:58, willi uebelherr <willi.uebelherr@riseup.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> Phillip, if you use B), you don't need A).

Consider email. If you and I were to use PGP or S/Mime encryption nobody can read the content of our messages. However, without transport-layer (or IP-layer. I’m an IPsec guy) encryption between the gmail server and the riseup.net <http://riseup.net/> server, anyone monitoring the traffic can know that I am sending you an email. Protecting SMTP with TLS makes the connection only expose that someone of gmail is sending a message to someone on riseup.net <http://riseup.net/>.  And “someone on gmail” is close to being half the Internet. So you really still need A.

Of course we are still vulnerable to Google or riseup.net <http://riseup.net/> informing on us.  Maybe we need some (E) about trustworthy intermediaries.

> And how do you want to prevent traffic analysis? In a telekcommunication system, where all actors are privat companies and act for the state institutions and with a star topology, you will never be able to prvent any form of traffic analysis.
> 
> Your writing is a little bit naive for me.

Well, TLS 1.3 and IPsec have some anti-traffic analysis feature, but there is little evidence of anyone using this effectively.

Yoav

> 
> greetings, willi
> 
> 
> 
> On 13/03/2017 20:13, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>> I think this particular failure demonstrates the situation pretty well:
>> http://www.zdnet.com/article/leaked-us-military-files-exposed/
>> 
>> A) Without transport encryption, every network link is a potential point of
>> compromise via traffic analysis.
>> 
>> B) Without end-to-end data level encryption, every non endpoint device,
>> every hard drive or removable storage is a potential point of compromise
>> 
>> C) Without end point security, the end points are a potential point of
>> compromise.
>> 
>> D) Without trustworthy personnel, you are vulnerable to an insider threat.
>> 
>> The security controls you need depends on your information security assets
>> and your security concerns.
>> 
>> If you are a high level security target then you need A + B + C + D. They
>> are not alternatives, they are all requirements. It is really completely
>> unhelpful for people to suggest tackling these separable concerns
>> separately is 'useless'.
>> 
>> Just as I would not consider personnel or physical security at the same
>> time as end point security, I do not want to consider data level security
>> at the same time as end point.
>> 
>> To get back to the CIA leak, that 'hole you can drive a truck through' did
>> not actually exist when the AV package was connected to the Internet. What
>> we are seeing here is not a set of vulnerabilities, it is a set of research
>> notes being compiled by people searching for vulnerabilities that has
>> subsequently been exfiltrated, filtered to remove the good stuff and
>> dumped.
>> 
>> If you do end point security right, you can really be a 'PITA' to the
>> people trying to break these systems. So the idea that end point security
>> is futile is utterly misguided. If you use default deny approaches, end
>> point security can be very effective. But end point security really isn't
>> in scope for IETF unless we were to get into protocols for attestation of
>> trustworthy hardware or the like.
>> 
>> 
>> The reason I keep coming back to the data level security issue is that
>> 
>> 1) It is in scope for IETF. Data level security protects data at rest and
>> in motion.
>> 
>> 2) There have been recent expiries and are imminent pending expiries of key
>> IPR that makes a solution much easier.
>> 
>> 3) It is one of the things we can fix that has the greatest security payoff.
>> 
>