Re: The CIA mentions us

willi uebelherr <> Tue, 14 March 2017 04:58 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B9F11294BC for <>; Mon, 13 Mar 2017 21:58:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.722
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.722 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=-0.01, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=-0.01, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key)
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iYLRliwR_3I5 for <>; Mon, 13 Mar 2017 21:58:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( []) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 07A1D129443 for <>; Mon, 13 Mar 2017 21:58:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from (unknown []) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "*", Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK)) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 920C11A14CA for <>; Tue, 14 Mar 2017 04:58:22 +0000 (UTC)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple;; s=squak; t=1489467502; bh=yDYWhl/Rw61oqWJl7IIuWJ++i/BCxrec9cxFvHiIBVQ=; h=Subject:References:From:To:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=Heh3KxTAxurpcaMBX47uo0LtWwvkhBFXPoTVpE2Qc1WqInNjbONUEsZ30YmudlDC2 SCVD36XNA9Kzxtkms+ha1Vzm2Dr4VjRL6XaBfzhdPzg0BTA8zxv2nz7aKUeqwwRrxj YbkS9NmdkMeOK5KiTKR9YUhIbykManTe5Q9GE6Yo=
Received: from [] (localhost []) (Authenticated sender: willi.uebelherr) with ESMTPSA id F3EB01C0084
Subject: Re: The CIA mentions us
References: <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
From: willi uebelherr <>
To: IETF discussion <>
Message-ID: <>
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 01:58:05 -0300
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <>
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 04:58:24 -0000

Phillip, if you use B), you don't need A).

And how do you want to prevent traffic analysis? In a telekcommunication 
system, where all actors are privat companies and act for the state 
institutions and with a star topology, you will never be able to prvent 
any form of traffic analysis.

Your writing is a little bit naive for me.

greetings, willi

On 13/03/2017 20:13, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> I think this particular failure demonstrates the situation pretty well:
> A) Without transport encryption, every network link is a potential point of
> compromise via traffic analysis.
> B) Without end-to-end data level encryption, every non endpoint device,
> every hard drive or removable storage is a potential point of compromise
> C) Without end point security, the end points are a potential point of
> compromise.
> D) Without trustworthy personnel, you are vulnerable to an insider threat.
> The security controls you need depends on your information security assets
> and your security concerns.
> If you are a high level security target then you need A + B + C + D. They
> are not alternatives, they are all requirements. It is really completely
> unhelpful for people to suggest tackling these separable concerns
> separately is 'useless'.
> Just as I would not consider personnel or physical security at the same
> time as end point security, I do not want to consider data level security
> at the same time as end point.
> To get back to the CIA leak, that 'hole you can drive a truck through' did
> not actually exist when the AV package was connected to the Internet. What
> we are seeing here is not a set of vulnerabilities, it is a set of research
> notes being compiled by people searching for vulnerabilities that has
> subsequently been exfiltrated, filtered to remove the good stuff and
> dumped.
> If you do end point security right, you can really be a 'PITA' to the
> people trying to break these systems. So the idea that end point security
> is futile is utterly misguided. If you use default deny approaches, end
> point security can be very effective. But end point security really isn't
> in scope for IETF unless we were to get into protocols for attestation of
> trustworthy hardware or the like.
> The reason I keep coming back to the data level security issue is that
> 1) It is in scope for IETF. Data level security protects data at rest and
> in motion.
> 2) There have been recent expiries and are imminent pending expiries of key
> IPR that makes a solution much easier.
> 3) It is one of the things we can fix that has the greatest security payoff.