Re: The CIA mentions us

[willi uebelherr <[e-mail]>]

Phillip, if you use B), you don't need A).

And how do you want to prevent traffic analysis? In a telekcommunication 
system, where all actors are privat companies and act for the state 
institutions and with a star topology, you will never be able to prvent 
any form of traffic analysis.

Your writing is a little bit naive for me.

greetings, willi



On 13/03/2017 20:13, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> I think this particular failure demonstrates the situation pretty well:
> http://www.zdnet.com/article/leaked-us-military-files-exposed/
>
> A) Without transport encryption, every network link is a potential point of
> compromise via traffic analysis.
>
> B) Without end-to-end data level encryption, every non endpoint device,
> every hard drive or removable storage is a potential point of compromise
>
> C) Without end point security, the end points are a potential point of
> compromise.
>
> D) Without trustworthy personnel, you are vulnerable to an insider threat.
>
> The security controls you need depends on your information security assets
> and your security concerns.
>
> If you are a high level security target then you need A + B + C + D. They
> are not alternatives, they are all requirements. It is really completely
> unhelpful for people to suggest tackling these separable concerns
> separately is 'useless'.
>
> Just as I would not consider personnel or physical security at the same
> time as end point security, I do not want to consider data level security
> at the same time as end point.
>
> To get back to the CIA leak, that 'hole you can drive a truck through' did
> not actually exist when the AV package was connected to the Internet. What
> we are seeing here is not a set of vulnerabilities, it is a set of research
> notes being compiled by people searching for vulnerabilities that has
> subsequently been exfiltrated, filtered to remove the good stuff and
> dumped.
>
> If you do end point security right, you can really be a 'PITA' to the
> people trying to break these systems. So the idea that end point security
> is futile is utterly misguided. If you use default deny approaches, end
> point security can be very effective. But end point security really isn't
> in scope for IETF unless we were to get into protocols for attestation of
> trustworthy hardware or the like.
>
>
> The reason I keep coming back to the data level security issue is that
>
> 1) It is in scope for IETF. Data level security protects data at rest and
> in motion.
>
> 2) There have been recent expiries and are imminent pending expiries of key
> IPR that makes a solution much easier.
>
> 3) It is one of the things we can fix that has the greatest security payoff.
>