[IPsec] Typos in draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-04

Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Fri, 29 August 2014 13:13 UTC

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Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:11:46 +0300
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
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Subject: [IPsec] Typos in draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-04
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Valery Smyslov writes:
> if new version of draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis is issued,
> then it is also possible fix a typo I've come across.
> 
> Section 2.8.1, second para:
>    This form of rekeying may temporarily result in multiple similar SAs
>    between the same pairs of nodes.  When there are two SAs eligible to
>    receive packets, a node MUST accept incoming packets through either
>    SA.  If redundant SAs are created though such a collision, the SA
>                                                       ^^^^^^ 
> s/though/through
>    created with the lowest of the four nonces used in the two exchanges
>    SHOULD be closed by the endpoint that created it.

This typo was already noticed and fixed during the rfc-editor process.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi