Re: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

-----Original Message-----
From: jose [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:34 PM
To: The IESG
Cc: jose-chairs@tools.ietf.org; draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key@tools.ietf.org;
jose@ietf.org
Subject: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33:
(with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Richard Barnes has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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Section 4.3.
"The "use" and "key_ops" JWK members SHOULD NOT be used together."
Did the WG discuss how these could combine?  What was the outcome of that
discussion?  This could be an important point for interoperability.  For
example, WebCrypto enforces them both, so it will break if it gets a key
with "use" and "key_ops" set to inconsistent values.
https://dvcs.w3.org/hg/webcrypto-api/raw-file/tip/spec/Overview.html#rsa-pss
-operations

[JLS] The set of values in use and key_ops do not have the same granularity.
This means that if you use both, you will be granting things in use that are
not granted in key_ops.  This was discussed by the group.

Section 8.
"[TBD]@ietf.org"
This needs to be populated before approval.  I don't know what's customary
here, but "jose@ietf.org" is an obvious candidate.

[JLS] If this is going to be an IANA moderated list, then it should be
filled in by IANA at the time of publishing and not now.  I believe that was
the original intent.

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COMMENT:
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Section 1.1.
The pointer for BASE64URL should be to JWS.  One level of indirection,
please :)

Section 4.
It might be worth being explicit (here or elsewhere):
"A JWK MUST NOT contain algorithm-specific members for key type other the
one specified in its "kty" attribute."

Section 4.1.
"cryptographic algorithm family used with the key"
"... such as "RSA" or "EC"."

Section 4.7.
"base64 encoded ([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER"
It seems unpleasant for implementations to have to support two flavors of
base64, especially since this doesn't use PEM directly.  Did the WG discuss
just using BASE64URL?

Section 9.1.
It might help here to note that technologies like PKIX and JWT can allow
relying parties to verify the provenance of a key and binding of attributes
to it.

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