Re: [lisp] Fwd: decentralization of Internet (was Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

[Dino Farinacci <[e-mail]>]

> I think it would actually be quite interesting to use "standard" public key encryption, rather than symmetric encryption in LISP. This would reduce the need for negotiations, not require pairs of ITRs and ETRs to share the same map server, etc. Admittedly it might not be practical for other reasons.. (may need to store lots of large keys, might be too slow, etc)

Correct. If we don't start with the above assumptions, anything else will be too complicated to implement and deploy and therefore, corners will be cut, and insecurity will continue.

> Here's one way to do it:
> You could easily attaching a PGP key id to the RLOCs in the mapping record returned in map-replies. When an ITR receives a map-reply, the ITR could grab the public key from one of the well-known keyservers, and use that public key for encrypting traffic to that ETR.

Do you not want to solve man-in-the-middle attacks? Is this recommendation solely for providing data privacy?

Dino

> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Michiel
> 
> On 8 Sep 2013, at 16:04, Edward Lopez <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> 
>> Key generation/management/distribution would be the real difficulty.  It would be desirable to use symmetric encryption (Ex. AES256) to encrypt LISP payloads.  Therefore, we use certs & asymmetric encryption (some form of ECC) at the time of xTR registration to provide a method to distribute keys to authenticated site members.
>> 
>> Another consideration is to encrypt just the EID header, and have EIDs use IPSec (thus LISP would in effect encrypt the outer IPSec ESP header).  Someone in the RLOC space would then require two keys to decrypt the message fully, and the encryption load would be distributed between EIDs and xTRs
>> 
>> Ed Lopez
>> 
>> Sent from my iPhone ... Sorry for any auto-correct errors
>> 
>> On Sep 8, 2013, at 10:04 AM, "Noel Chiappa" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>>>> From: Marc Binderberger <[e-mail]>
>>> 
>>>> Lisp is separating Identity from Location but this doesn't mean the
>>>> RLOC can not be used to identify you. In case of static setups this is
>>>> obvious, take the RLOC, go to the ISP, get the (physical) address and
>>>> name.
>>> 
>>> Err, that would get the address and name of the ITR, not the actual source
>>> host.
>>> 
>>> Depending on all sorts of factors, that plus the encrypted packet _might_ get
>>> them the identity of the actual originator (not, for example, if the ITR has
>>> discarded the key used to encrypt the packet by the time the subpoena
>>> arrives...)
>>> 
>>>  Noel
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>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
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