Re: [OAUTH-WG] tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23

Songhaibin <haibin.song@huawei.com> Fri, 17 February 2012 08:52 UTC

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Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:52:52 +0000
From: Songhaibin <haibin.song@huawei.com>
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mitre.org>
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Thread-topic: [OAUTH-WG] tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23
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Hi Justin,

Thank you for the clarification. See in line.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Justin Richer [mailto:jricher@mitre.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2012 9:44 PM
> To: Songhaibin
> Cc: tsv-ads@tools.ietf.org; draft-ietf-oauth-v2@tools.ietf.org; Martin Stiemerling;
> oauth@ietf.org; tsv-dir@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] tsv-dir review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23
> 
> On 02/15/2012 04:33 AM, Songhaibin wrote:
> > I've reviewed this document as part of the transport area directorate's ongoing
> effort to review key IETF documents. These comments were written primarily for
> the transport area directors, but are copied to the document's authors for their
> information and to allow them to address any issues raised. The authors should
> consider this review together with any other last-call comments they receive.
> Please always CC tsv-dir@ietf.org if you reply to or forward this review.
> >
> > First, I should apologize for the delay in this review, I should have finished it two
> days ago. I have some common security knowledge but not an expert.
> >
> > Summary
> >
> > This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits that should be fixed
> before publication.
> >
> > General issues need discussion:
> >
> > 1. Section 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 discuss two authorization grant type: resource owner
> password credentials, and client credentials. These two have the same flow and
> many in common, and they are significantly different than the authorization code
> grant type and implicit grant type described in previous sections. And in section
> 1.3.4, it also says " Client credentials are used as an authorization grant typically
> when the client is acting on its own behalf (the client is also the resource
> owner),...". Is it better to combine these two grant types as one "client
> credentials" grant type where the client can be the resource owner?
> 
> No, they are quite distinct -- It all comes down to what you're
> authenticating. The Resource Owner Password Credentials flow *also*
> includes client credentials which are distinct from the resource owner's
> own credentials. The client's credentials are going to be the same for a
> given client across many different users, while the Resource Owner's
> credentials are going to be different across different users, but the
> same across different clients (for the same resource owner). In most
> flows, the client's credentials identify just the client, and the
> resource owner is identified through some other means (a direct
> password, a redirected login to the authz endpoint). In the Client
> Credentials flow, the client's credentials are the only ones that you have.
> 

Okay, in the Resource Owner Password Credentials flow, it adds client credentials, but any client who was issued credentials from the authorization server can pass. How much security does the client credential in this flow add?

> > 2. Two concepts confused me in section 2.4, I don't know if I am the only person
> who is confusing here. One is user-agent-based application and another is native
> application, why are they executed on the device used by the resource owner? I
> think they can run on any device used by resource consumer instead of resource
> owner. Resource owner is only used to grant access to resources.
> 
> OAuth's main 3-legged pattern allows what's called "Alice-to-Alice
> sharing", in that the Client is consuming on behalf of the resource
> owner. In cases where you have an in-user-agent app or a native app, the
> end user (resource owner) is going to be the one running it, and the one
> authorizing it.
> 

Yes, I understand that. But the document seems like resource owner is the "only" one who can run the UA app or native app? Or I missed something?


Thanks,
-Haibin

> 
> Thanks for your feedback, and I hope this can help clear up the intent
> of the working group here. If you can suggest language that will
> solidify these points further, it can help make sure this doesn't
> further confuse people.
> 
>   -- Justin