Re: [OAUTH-WG] Security of OAuth on Andriod [Was: Re: Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend (TMI BFF)]

Om <omkarkhair@gmail.com> Wed, 17 March 2021 05:17 UTC

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From: Om <omkarkhair@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2021 10:47:03 +0530
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To: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
Cc: George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com>, Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Warren Parad <wparad=40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Security of OAuth on Andriod [Was: Re: Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend (TMI BFF)]
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If I read this correctly,
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-01#section-10 the 2.1
draft already addresses this under best practices.

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:31 PM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
wrote:

> I want to come back to this topic as a new thread.
>
> As I understand things, the difference on Android is that any app can
> claim to be a generic web browser and so claim to handle all URIs. Whereas
> on iOS only specifically vetted apps can claim to be web browsers. Is that
> correct?
>
> If so, this does seem like a quite large hole in security of OAuth on
> Android. Should we be considering a new draft recommending alternative
> measures (such as attestation) on Android? Presumably the same issue is
> also true on most desktop OS?
>
> — Neil
>
> On 23 Feb 2021, at 15:20, George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com> wrote:
>
> Unfortunately, in the mobile app world this isn't sufficient. On iOS using
> Universal Links will bind the https redirect_url to your app in a secure
> way but it doesn't work the same way on Android with App Links. There is
> still a problem with "mobile app impersonation". If you have an app that
> you want to ensure is "your" app then the most secure way is to look at
> "app attestation". This is however, way off topic for this thread :)
>
> On 2/14/21 9:28 AM, Neil Madden wrote:
>
> Public clients are implicitly authenticated by their ownership of the registered redirect_uri. This why it’s important to use a redirect_uri for which ownership can be reasonably established, such as HTTPS endpoints with exact URI matching.
>
> There are more things that can go wrong with that (see the security BCP), but it can be made reasonably secure.
>
> — Neil
>
>
> On 14 Feb 2021, at 13:48, Stoycho Sleptsov <stoycho.sleptsov@gmail.com> <stoycho.sleptsov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> 
> I would like to add my reasons about the "Why are developers creating BFF for their frontends to communicate with an AS",
> with the objective to verify if they are valid.
>
> I need the client app. to be authenticated at the AS (to determine if it is a first-party app., for example).
> If we decide to implement our client as a frontend SPA , then we have no other option except through a BFF, as PKCE does not help for authentication.
>
> Or is it considered a bad practice to do that?
>
> Regards,
> Stoycho.
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-- 
- Regards,
Omkar Khair