Re: [openpgp] Call for adoption of draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey

[Heiko Schäfer <[e-mail]>]

Hello all,

On 4/6/24 07:09, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> This draft describes a way to signal an OpenPGP replacement key without
> revoking the current key, which is intended to be a mechanism for
> adoption of new versions or algorithms that might otherwise be difficult
> to deploy:
>
>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gallagher-openpgp-replacementkey/
>
> Andrew Gallagher wrote a good description of the motivation and
> mechanism in the draft here:
>
>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/FdKennEntF4ZaR_UO82m_fe_ea0
>
> Please review the draft and consider whether you support its adoption by
> the WG.  Please share any thoughts with the list to indicate support or
> opposition -- this is not a vote.

after a careful read of the draft, as well as reading the discussion in 
this thread, I believe the concept that this draft outlines addresses an 
unpleasant papercut in OpenPGP. I think the direction is reasonable, and 
the draft thus worth adopting.

My understanding of the problem this draft addresses is:

A mechanism that allows the software of an OpenPGP user to automatically 
obtain a new certificate (or multiple) that their correspondent suggests 
for consideration.
However, trust calculations (e.g. when using web of trust calculations) 
are handled as a separate issue by this draft (after some thought and 
discussion, this seems like a good approach to me).

I imagine Simon's concerns could be (at least in part?) addressed by an 
additional section in the draft that outlines guidance for what the WG 
considers good practice.
This might include that the key holder should ask their contacts to 
verify the new key and issue third party certifications for it. It might 
also include that the key holder should issue a delegation/trust 
signature for their new certificate, using their old key.

Heiko