Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security)
"Prashanth Patil (praspati)" <praspati@cisco.com> Wed, 17 July 2013 13:05 UTC
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From: "Prashanth Patil (praspati)" <praspati@cisco.com>
To: Alper Yegin <alper.yegin@yegin.org>, "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security)
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Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2013 13:04:44 +0000
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Cc: "pcp@ietf.org" <pcp@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security)
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Hi Alper, In the example below, wont the ISP consider all users behind the home router as a single subscriber and not differentiate among individual users? Essentially, the PCP Server would treat the proxy (i.e the home router) as a single subscriber. -Prashanth On 17/07/13 5:02 PM, "Alper Yegin" <alper.yegin@yegin.org<mailto:alper.yegin@yegin.org>> wrote: If the PCP server wants to provide some sort of differentiated service to the subscribers (e.g., different mapping lifetime), then it needs to know the authenticated ID of the subscriber. Alper On Jul 17, 2013, at 10:09 AM, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) wrote: Please see inline [TR] From: Alper Yegin [mailto:alper.yegin@yegin.org] Sent: Wednesday, July 17, 2013 12:24 PM To: Prashanth Patil (praspati) Cc: pcp@ietf.org<mailto:pcp@ietf.org>; Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) Subject: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security) Hi Prashanth, I'm not sure if enough thought went into the PCP Proxy security. As much as I'd love to be DONE! with this discussion, I also want to make sure people feel comfortable having thought all aspects around the proxy use. For (very important) example, what kind of security associations are needed for securing the proxy use: An SA btw client and server, an SA btw client and proxy, an SA btw proxy and server -- which combinations of these are needed? We've included this in the updated version of auth req: REQ-9: A PCP proxy that modifies PCP messages SHOULD have the ability to independently authenticate with the PCP client and PCP server. The presence of a PCP proxy hence requires two separately authenticates SAs. As a consequence, the PCP proxy: A. MUST be able to validate message integrity of PCP messages from the PCP server and client respectively. B. MUST be able to ensure message integrity after updating the PCP message for cases described in sections 6 of ietf-pcp-proxy. The PCP proxy MUST also permit authentication on only one side of the proxy. For example, a customer premises host may not authenticate with the PCP proxy but the PCP proxy may authenticate with the PCP server. So: - We have two types of SAs. One between the client and the proxy, another between the proxy and the server. - None of them are mandatory to use. For each one that needs to be used, we need to perform authentication between the end-points. (e.g., between client and proxy). So, in a way, we are dealing with security in two independent parts; client to proxy, and proxy to server. They are totally segregated from security perspective. Right? Hmm, one thing: The server may need to know the authenticated ID of the client. Since it's not part of the client authentication, it won't know that value readily. So, we may need to define an option to carry that piece of information from the proxy to the server. [TR] Why would the PCP server need to know the authentication ID of the client. For example Home network; Alice (PCP client) -> Home Router (PCP Proxy) -> ISP (PCP Server) Why would PCP Server in ISP care about the authentication ID of Alice ? --Tiru. Alper -Prashanth Then we need to talk about how we dynamically create those using any one of these solutions. Alper On Jul 16, 2013, at 7:50 PM, Dave Thaler wrote: -----Original Message----- From: Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) [mailto:tireddy@cisco.com] Sent: Monday, July 15, 2013 10:51 PM To: Dave Thaler; pcp@ietf.org<mailto:pcp@ietf.org> Subject: RE: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Hi Dave, In the poll when you refer to PANA, please clarify the draft you are referring to http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ohba-pcp-pana-04 or http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ohba-pcp-pana-encap-01 ? --Tiru. The question is intentionally agnostic as this is about a general approach, not which specific implementation. If it helps, you can interpret the answer as "which of the two you think is better". If the consensus is PANA rather than direct EAP-in-PCP, then we could ask as a follow-up question which of the two we should go with. If you'd like to include your answer to that now though, feel free to include that in your response to the call. -Dave _______________________________________________ pcp mailing list pcp@ietf.org<mailto:pcp@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pcp _______________________________________________ pcp mailing list pcp@ietf.org<mailto:pcp@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pcp
- [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Dave Thaler
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Dave Thaler
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Prashanth Patil (praspati)
- [pcp] REQ-14 in PCP Authentication Requirements Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
- [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL on P… Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Prashanth Patil (praspati)
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Prashanth Patil (praspati)
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Dan Wing
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Ben McCann
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Alper Yegin
- [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL… Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Rafa Marin Lopez
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Prashanth Patil (praspati)
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Prashanth Patil (praspati)
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Ben McCann
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Rafa Marin Lopez
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Ben McCann
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Dan Wing
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … Prashanth Patil (praspati)
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Prashanth Patil (praspati)
- Re: [pcp] REQ-14 in PCP Authentication Requiremen… Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] Proxy security (was Re: CONSENSUS CALL … yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Rafa Marin Lopez
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Tina TSOU
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Martija, Ricardo V
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Dave Thaler
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Stuart Cheshire
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Subir Das
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Ted Lemon
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Rafa Marin Lopez
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Pedro Moreno Sánchez
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Ted Lemon
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Ted Lemon
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alan DeKok
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alan DeKok
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alan DeKok
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Dacheng Zhang
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Ted Lemon
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Tassos Chatzithomaoglou
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Subir Das
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security yoshihiro.ohba
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alan DeKok
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alan DeKok
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alan DeKok
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Subir Das
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Pedro Moreno Sánchez
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Tassos Chatzithomaoglou
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Dave Thaler
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Tassos Chatzithomaoglou
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Alper Yegin
- Re: [pcp] CONSENSUS CALL on PCP security Margaret Wasserman
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … Ben McCann
- Re: [pcp] PANA misconceptions (was Re: CONSENSUS … yoshihiro.ohba