Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-revoked certificates.
"Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <pritikin@cisco.com> Tue, 30 October 2012 15:59 UTC
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From: "Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <pritikin@cisco.com>
To: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-revoked certificates.
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2012 15:59:51 +0000
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Cc: "<pkix@ietf.org>" <pkix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-revoked certificates.
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#1 The system should fail closed. I agree with Paul Hoffman's point that this extends the definition of the 'revoked' response during this protocol exchange which must be noted. I'd also accept a new "unknown, fail closed" type response so long as clients that don't yet understand this new response fail closed. - max On Oct 30, 2012, at 3:52 AM, Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com> wrote: > Before we loose everyone engaged in this, I would like to make a > straw-poll: > > > Background: > A client may do a request for a certificate that has never been issued by > the CA. > This request may be done deliberately, by mistake or as a consequence of a > compromised CA. > > The OCSP protocol does not require OCSP responders to have any knowledge > about issued certificates. It must only know about revoked certificates > that are within it's current validity period. However, some OCSP > responders closely coupled with the CA may also know if a certificate with > a particular serialNumber value has been issued or not. > > The following is agreed: > - An OCSP responder is allowed to respond "good" to a status request > for a non-revoked certificate, disregarding if it has ever been issued. > > - A client, having no additional out-of-band knowledge about the OCSP > responder, will just know that the certificate is "not revoked" when > receiving a "good" response, unless the response includes one or more > response extensions that provides additional information. > > > The following is debated: > - Is an OCSP responder allowed to respond "revoked" even if a requested > certificate serial number is not on the list of revoked certificates, IF > the OCSP responder has positive knowledge that the requested serial number > does NOT represent a valid certificate issued by the identified CA? > > > Rationale for: > There are a number of reasons to allow this that has been mentioned, such > as: > - It breaks nothing. A legitimate request for an issued certificate will > get a legitimate deterministic response. > - It's safer. Responding "revoked" may not prevent a compromised CA from > being exploited. But if a request for a serialNumber that is known to be > bad is done nevertheless, a "revoked" response will at least be safer than > responding "good". > - Allowing extension definitions with further semantics. A response > extension may be defined in the future that adds more information about > the requested certificate. This may include a positive confirmation that > the certificate has been issued as well as information that this > particular OCSP responder will only respond "good" if it knows that the > requested certificate has been issued, otherwise it will respond > "revoked". An extension with such semantics can only be defined if the > base standard allows a status other than "good" in such situation. > - Supporting Web-PKI. The CAB-Forum has indicated that they will profile > the OCSP protocol for use with web server authentication. In such profile > they have indicated that they will NOT allow the "good" response unless > the requested certificate is known to have been issued. This means that > they will require OCSP responder in their infrastructure to have this > knowledge. Such profile would have to break the base OCSP standard if this > states that "good" MUST be returned unless the certificate has been > revoked. > > Rationale against: > The basic rationale against raised on this list has been the argument that > it is wrong and confusing to allow anything but "good" as a response to a > non-revoked certificate (if the cert is issued by a CA that is served by > this OCSP responder). > Another strong opinion is that it basically does not solve anything. A > broken CA is broken and can't be fixed by responding "revoked". It would > be easy to adapt an attack to circumvent such response, for example by > issuing a fake certificate that duplicates a legitimate serialNumber. > > > Please reply with either: > > 1. Allow "revoked" response for a certificate that has not been "revoked" > but where that OCSP responder for any other reason knows the certificate > to be "bad". > > 2. Require that the OCSP responder MUST respond "good" in this situation. > > 3. Neither 1 or 2 (motivate). > > > > > Note: both alternatives are placed in a context where the certificate is > claimed to be issued by a CA that is served by this OCSP responder. The > exact meaning of "bad" is for later discussion. > > Please keep any motivation short and do not use this thread for long > debates. > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > pkix mailing list > pkix@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Denis Pinkas
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Simon Tardell
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Denis Pinkas
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Denis Pinkas
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Simon Tardell
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Simon Tardell
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Denis Pinkas
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Peter Rybar
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-revok… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Yoav Nir
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Miller, Timothy J.
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… David Chadwick
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Art Allison
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Miller, Timothy J.
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Yoav Nir
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Peter Rybar
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Juan Gonzalez
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Max Pritikin (pritikin)
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Simon Tardell
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Carl Wallace
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Rick Robinson
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Melinda Shore
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Russ Housley
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Tom Ritter
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Johannes Merkle
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Denis Pinkas
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Art Allison
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Ryan Hurst
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Ben Wilson
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Erwann Abalea
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses fornon-re… Art Allison
- [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued certific… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Tom Ritter
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Tom Ritter
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… David A. Cooper
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… David A. Cooper
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Peter Rybar
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Simon Tardell
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… David A. Cooper
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Peter Rybar
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Simon Tardell
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Martin Rex
- Re: [pkix] Proposed resolution to non-issued cert… Piyush Jain
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Tom Gindin
- Re: [pkix] Straw-poll on OCSP responses for non-r… Phillip Hallam-Baker