Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06

["Piyush Jain" <[e-mail]>]

> A well-behaving OCSP responder is one that does not let RPs fall for
> fraudulent certs when it knows pretty damn well that the cert that the RP
is
> requesting the status, for can not possibly be a bona fide
> certificate.   An OCSP responder that lets RPs down so recklessly
> does not count as trustworthy on my scorecard. (Bad dog, no cookie).

This is the unintended consequence that I was talking about earlier. People
will actually start believing that OCSP responders certified by a
compromised CA are trustworthy and authoritative if these responders issue
revoked for fraudulent certificates. 

Martin - If the RP does not check that the payload certificate is bound to
the issuing CA, OCSP response is meaningless. And if the payload certificate
is cryptographically bound to the CA, and CA thinks it is not issued then
the CA and as a result OCSP responder certified by the CA are compromised
and hence not trustworthy.

Not saying that OCSP responder should return revoked in this case, but if it
does the, right reason code should be CACompromised. After all such a
certificate could only be issued (or shall I say non-issued) if the CA is
compromised.

-Piyush