Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Minor TLS draft editorial corrections (#2446)

[MikkelFJ <[e-mail]>]

mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> @@ -216,10 +216,12 @@ Note that this omits the EndOfEarlyData message, which is not used in QUIC (see
 
 Data is protected using a number of encryption levels:
 
-- Plaintext
-- Early Data (0-RTT) Keys
-- Handshake Keys
-- Application Data (1-RTT) Keys
+- Initial Keys can be derived by any observer, and so they do not
+  provide cryptographic protection or authentication.
+- Early Data (0-RTT) Keys. These keys are not forward-secure and must protect
+  only idempotent data.
+- Handshake Keys do not authenticate either endpoint.
+- Application Data (1-RTT) Keys provide full authentication and encryption.
 

I think this looses to overview of what levels exist. This bullet list now replaces an overview with an explanation. Perhaps keep the original list, and add an explanation below.

> @@ -269,7 +271,7 @@ At a high level, there are two main interactions between the TLS and QUIC
 components:
 
 * The TLS component sends and receives messages via the QUIC component, with
-  QUIC providing a reliable stream abstraction to TLS.
+  QUIC providing a reliable stream and record abstraction to TLS.
 

I'm not sure QUIC provides the record abstraction, at least not entirely, it only handles the record protection. TLS still does its own internal record framing as I understand it, but don't take my word for it.

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