Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] use a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame to drive the handshake to confirmation (#3145)

[ianswett <[e-mail]>]

ianswett commented on this pull request.

Some comments, one to add a backstop in case the server fails to send this in a timely manner.

> @@ -385,13 +385,9 @@ perspective of the endpoint in question.
 
 ### Handshake Confirmed {#handshake-confirmed}
 
-In this document, the TLS handshake is considered confirmed at an endpoint when
-the following two conditions are met: the handshake is complete, and the
-endpoint has received an acknowledgment for a packet sent with 1-RTT keys.
-This second condition can be implemented by recording the lowest packet number
-sent with 1-RTT keys, and the highest value of the Largest Acknowledged field
-in any received 1-RTT ACK frame: once the latter is higher than or equal to the
-former, the handshake is confirmed.
+In this document, the TLS handshake is considered confirmed at the server when
+the handshake completes. At the client, the handshake is considered confirmed
+when the HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is received.

Suggestion: or when an acknowledgement of a 1-RTT packet is received.

I think this provides a stopgap against servers that make stupid or malicious errors.

Also, why aren't you explicitly specifying when the server thinks the handshake is confirmed?

> @@ -760,14 +756,12 @@ and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
 
 ### Discarding Handshake Keys
 
-An endpoint MUST NOT discard its handshake keys until the TLS handshake is
-confirmed ({{handshake-confirmed}}).  An endpoint SHOULD discard its handshake
-keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most application protocols
-will send data after the handshake, resulting in acknowledgements that allow
-both endpoints to discard their handshake keys promptly.  Endpoints that do
-not have reason to send immediately after completing the handshake MAY send
-ack-eliciting frames, such as PING, which will cause the handshake to be
-confirmed when they are acknowledged.
+An endpoint MUST discard its handshake keys when the TLS handshake is confirmed

I'd vote for SHOULD, because I tend to think dropping them immediately is the best option, but I'm not convinced anything terrible happens if a peer delays dropping them a bit.

> @@ -760,14 +756,9 @@ and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
 
 ### Discarding Handshake Keys
 
-An endpoint MUST NOT discard its handshake keys until the TLS handshake is
-confirmed ({{handshake-confirmed}}).  An endpoint SHOULD discard its handshake
-keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most application protocols
-will send data after the handshake, resulting in acknowledgements that allow
-both endpoints to discard their handshake keys promptly.  Endpoints that do
-not have reason to send immediately after completing the handshake MAY send
-ack-eliciting frames, such as PING, which will cause the handshake to be
-confirmed when they are acknowledged.
+An endpoint MUST discard its handshake keys when the TLS handshake is confirmed
+({{handshake-confirmed}}).  The server MUST send a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame within
+one round-trip time of handshake completion.

I tend to agree with @kazuho point.  How about "The server MUST send HANDSHAKE_DONE with the first outgoing 1-RTT packet or within one round-trip time of handshake completion if no 1-RTT packets are sent."

@kazuho If the server is sending HANDSHAKE_DONE, isn't it no longer 0.5RTT data?

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