Re: [Rats] Call for charter consensus

[Laurence Lundblade <[e-mail]>]

> On Jan 24, 2019, at 8:53 AM, Carsten Bormann <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> On Jan 19, 2019, at 02:23, Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>> On the one hand,
>> there's the raw crypto bits of "this is what signature validation/MIC
>> verification/etc. you have to do in order to get the cryptographic
>> validation that key X generated data Y [at time Z]”,
> 
> I would call that “verification” (related to “authentication”).

agree

> 
>> but once you've done
>> that, the decision of verifying that Y and Z are something you find
>> trustworthy to perform action W is not really something we can standardize.
> 
> I would call that “policy realization” (related to “authorization”).

This could split finer into:
- check against known good value (KGV)
- actual policy

Recently I have been doing some thinking about claims about SW components that includes measurements of those components. In that thinking the question about how you compare those measurements comes up when considering versions of the SW components and variations over time on how those measurements are performed (e.g. upgrading to new hash algs, measuring code in a file vs execute-in-place code…)

How you check against KGV probably needs to be taken into account when we design the claim data model.

> 
>> My understanding is that we plan to talk about the crypto but not, at least
>> at first, what you do after confirming that the crypto has not been
>> tampered with.
> 
> That is also my understanding: we enable verification, but we don’t do the policy.

Agreed that we don’t do policy, but maybe we should at least consider implications for checks against KGV.

LL