Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection
Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Fri, 14 October 2022 12:33 UTC
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Konrad Iwanicki <iwanicki@mimuw.edu.pl>, Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks <roll@ietf.org>
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Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:33:22 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection
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Konrad Iwanicki <iwanicki@mimuw.edu.pl> wrote: > On 13/10/2022 18:05, Michael Richardson wrote: >> Konrad Iwanicki <iwanicki@mimuw.edu.pl> wrote: >> > 3. Is rebuilding the DODAG in such a case desirable? >> > If the majority of links to the root that have once formed a DODAG >> are >> > currently down, then the DODAG should probably look different than for >> > the network with those links up. Rebuilding the DODAG, at least in my >> > opinion, makes a lot of sense in such a case. Furthermore, the threshold >> > describing how large the majority is is configurable. Depending on whether >> > one wants to prioritize speeding up root failure detection or slowing down >> > DODAG rebuilding, different values can be chosen. >> Do the sentinels need to agree on this threshold? > Yes, they should. This is a configuration parameter of the protocol. I don't remember if this goes into the DIO or not. Should it? what is the effect of the parameter being different on different sentinels? (It's a pathological case, but worth thinking about for 30s) For me, I clearly should read the document again top to bottom, since it's been many months. I guess I could volunteer to document shepherd. I think we should WGLC the document already. Perhaps in mid-November, I'll have time to finish debugging my RFC8994 implementation. I think that this protocol would be useful in the ACP case, but I'd be many months away from implementing. -- Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Michael Richardson
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Michael Richardson
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Michael Richardson
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Michael Richardson
- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki
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- Re: [Roll] Border router failure detection Konrad Iwanicki