Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative

"Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com> Thu, 23 January 2014 08:55 UTC

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From: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [rtcweb] Consent alternative
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Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 08:55:16 +0000
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Cc: "Cullen Jennings \(fluffy\)" <fluffy@cisco.com>, "rtcweb@ietf.org" <rtcweb@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Martin Thomson [mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com]
> Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2014 9:43 AM
> To: Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
> Cc: Muthu Arul Mozhi Perumal (mperumal); Cullen Jennings (fluffy);
> rtcweb@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Consent alternative
> 
> On 22 January 2014 18:01, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)
> <tireddy@cisco.com> wrote:
> > I am still referring to off-path attacker only who can sniff packets and spoof
> IP address but cannot modify or consume packets.
> 
> How exactly is this attacker able to generate a valid heartbeat ?

In the example attack you had mentioned, Attacker B knows both the master secret and STUN short-term username/password. It will sniff the heartbeat request sent by A, spoof IP address of C and send valid heartbeat response. Same problem exists with STUN consent. 

-Tiru.