[saag] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash functions [was: Re: [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate]
David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> Mon, 05 January 2009 22:50 UTC
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From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
To: RJ Atkinson <rja@extremenetworks.com>
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Cc: cfrg@irtf.org, saag@ietf.org
Subject: [saag] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash functions [was: Re: [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate]
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Hi Ran, I think it is a great idea to document the IETF applications/uses of hashing, and the attacks against particular uses of hashing. It would make a great CFRG informational RFC, if we can find volunteers to contribute to and edit it. I offer to review it. David On Dec 31, 2008, at 7:48 AM, RJ Atkinson wrote: > > [Distribution trimmed slightly to reduce cross-posting and improve > SNR.] > > On 30 Dec 2008, at 20:20, Peter Gutmann wrote: >> The current MD5 attack is very cool but there's no need to worry >> about >> bad guys doing much with it because it's much, much easier to get >> legitimate CA-issued certs the normal way, you buy them just like >> everyone else does (except that you use someone else's credit card >> and identity, obviously). > > > Two thoughts: > > 1) Protocol Issues > > The IETF ought to be thinking about a wide range of IETF protools > in the same way that Peter thinks about CA security issues above. > > For some IETF protocols, for example all of the IGP authentication > extensions (excepting RFC-2154, AFAICT), active non-cryptographic > attacks are feasible (if not yet seen in the deployed world, AFAICT) > that are much easier than *any* cryptographic attack. Again, and > only by way of example, RFC-4822 discusses some of these that are > specific to RIPv2 authentication. > > For protocols where non-cryptographic attacks are feasible AND > are lower cost than a cryptographic attack, really it does not make > much difference what cryptographic algorithm gets deployed by a user > -- and the IETF's focus should be on improving the underlying > authentication mechanism BEFORE worrying about which cryptographic > algorithms are being deployed. > > Attackers are generally both smart and lazy, so they won't waste > time on an expensive cryptographic attack when a lower effort > non-cryptographic attack exists. > > > 2) Hash algorithm analysis > > It would be very helpful if a *set* of mathematicians/cryptographers > could jointly put together a summary of the known attacks on all > the widely used hash algorithms (e.g. MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, > SHA-2, others), *including references to the published literature*. > > Ideally, this analysis would also include discussion of whether those > attacks apply for those same algorithms when used in the modes > employed > by various IETF protocols today (e.g. Keyed-Hash as used in OSPFv2 MD5 > or RIPv2 MD5, HMAC-Hash, and so forth). > > This would be most useful to have as an Informational RFC, > and SOON, so that IETF WGs could have some "consensus" document > to refer to -- and to cite explicitly -- if any IETF WGs decide > to make hash algorithm recommendations or decisions. > > I don't understand IRTF process details perfectly, but perhaps > the CFRG chairs might undertake creating such a document as a > near-term official CFRG group project. > > Yours, > > Ran > rja@extremenetworks.com > > _______________________________________________ > Cfrg mailing list > Cfrg@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg _______________________________________________ saag mailing list saag@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
- [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA ce… Russ Housley
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Russ Housley
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Russ Housley
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Russ Housley
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Russ Housley
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Nicolas Williams
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Hugo Krawczyk
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… RJ Atkinson
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Vishwas Manral
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … RJ Atkinson
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Ben Laurie
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [saag] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash functio… Sean Shen
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Paul Hoffman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Ben Laurie
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Ben Laurie
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Sean Shen
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Paul Hoffman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Peter Gutmann
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Paul Hoffman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… RL 'Bob' Morgan
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Peter Hesse
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Blake Ramsdell
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Scott Rea
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Tim Moses
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Mike
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Richard Graveman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Mike
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Philipp Guehring
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Mike
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Peter Hesse
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Weger, B.M.M. de
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Yoav Nir
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… der Mouse
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… RJ Atkinson
- [saag] attacks on keyed-hash constructions [was: … David McGrew
- Re: [saag] attacks on keyed-hash constructions [w… RJ Atkinson
- [saag] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash functions [… David McGrew
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash … Paul Hoffman
- Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue C… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash … Vishwas Manral
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash functio… Sean Turner
- Re: [saag] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash functio… David McGrew
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash … David McGrew
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] attacks on keyed-hash construct… Christian Rechberger
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash … Ran Canetti
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a … Timothy J. Miller
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash … David McGrew
- Re: [saag] [Cfrg] RFC analyzing IETF use of hash … Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)