Re: [saag] [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CAcertificate

["Santosh Chokhani" <[e-mail]>]

You have some time there and work with client vendors to implement
SHA-256 and next generation SHA.

I would support a random value extension if clients checked for it.

-----Original Message-----
From: Timothy J. Miller [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2008 1:54 PM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: Dr Stephen Henson; [e-mail]; [e-mail];
[e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue
CAcertificate

Santosh Chokhani wrote:

> So, if you are relying on CAs, why not ask them to switch to SHA-1 as
> opposed to adding more software to the CA.  SHA-1 is purely a
> configuration item for the CA deployments.

Because someday SHA-1 (and SHA-2, or any hash algorithm) may be subject 
to a similar collision generation attack, and the presence of 
unpredictable data in the cert will defeat it as well.

Just trying to be proactive here.

-- Tim

_______________________________________________
saag mailing list
[e-mail]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag