Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data

Randall Gellens <randy@qti.qualcomm.com> Wed, 16 September 2015 04:21 UTC

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Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2015 21:21:14 -0700
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From: Randall Gellens <randy@qti.qualcomm.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data@tools.ietf.org, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data
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I've made these changes and included the two references.  Thanks very much.

At 8:09 PM -0700 9/15/15, Magnus Nyström wrote:

>  Yes, at least mandating TLS 1.2 or higher and recommending as per above
>  seems reasonable.
>  The references for the GCM suites would be RFC 5288 and RFC 5289.
>
>  Thanks!
>
>  On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 7:06 PM, Randall Gellens <randy@qti.qualcomm.com>
>  wrote:
>
>>  Hi Magnus,
>>
>>  I think we can mandate TLS 1.2 or later without any problem, and I can add
>>  that to the text that mandates HTTPS.  I don't think I can add MTI cypher
>>  suites at this stage, but I think it would be OK to add text such as "it is
>>  RECOMMENDED to use only suites that offer Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and
>>  avoid Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)", with your list of suites as an example.
>>  What do you think?  If we go this way, I'd probably need to also add an
>>  informational reference or two; what do you suggest?
>>
>>  At 6:39 PM -0700 9/15/15, Magnus Nyström wrote:
>>
>>   Hi Randall,
>>>   Yes, I guess it may be surprising ... but I was thinking more about
>>>  getting this effort implemented in an expedited fashion rather than
>>>  potentially delaying due to the potential issues (also pointed out in the
>>>  draft) around getting the necessary trust anchors in place between PSAPs
>>>  and service providers enabling the mutual authentication.
>>>
>>>   It may be good to say something about MTI suites - I would suggest
>>>  mandating support for a set of suites that offers PFS and avoids CBC, e.g.,
>>>  something like:
>>>
>>>   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
>>>
>>>   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>>>
>>>   TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
>>>
>>>   TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>>>
>>>   TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
>>>
>>>   TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>>>
>>>
>>>   I would also suggest mandating TLS 1.2 (or later) for a new application
>>>  like this.
>>>   On the last point, yes, if the service provider is in a possession to
>>>  vouch for or sanity-check then that could help introduce reliability.
>>>
>>>   Best,
>>>
>>>
>>>   On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 at 5:58 PM, Randall Gellens <<mailto:
>>>  randy@qti.qualcomm.com>randy@qti.qualcomm.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>   Hi Magnus,
>>>
>>>   Thank you for your review and comments.  Please see in-line.
>>>
>>>   At 9:26 PM -0700 8/31/15, Magnus Nyström wrote:
>>>
>>>    I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>>  ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
>>>  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
>>>  directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
>>>  like any other last call comments.
>>>
>>>    This memo provides fundamental data structure definitions and
>>>  procedural rules for providing auxiliary information to public service
>>>  answering points (PSAPs) when emergency calls are being made.
>>>
>>>
>>>    This reads as an important memo and has been at least five years in the
>>>  making. I don't find the Security (and Privacy) Considerations section
>>>  lacking per se, but do have these questions:
>>>
>>>    - Why require HTTPS for the reference case but not the value case (I
>>>  can understand why you don't require it for the value case, but couldn't it
>>>  be a choice for the PSAP also in the reference case? This would also seem
>>>  to simplify during an introductory phase when a wide-spread PKI solution is
>>>  not yet in place.)?
>>>
>>>
>>>   I'm very surprised that a security area person is asking why we don't
>>>  make TLS optional!  It's a valid question, of course, just surprising in
>>>  this context.  Because of the limited scope of the document, specifically
>>>  emergency services, and given that the dereferencing entities will be PSAPs
>>>  and other responders that have upgraded to support next-generation, we felt
>>>  that it was reasonable to require the use of TLS and client-side
>   >> certificates for dereferencing.
>>>
>>>    - When HTTPS is required, I assume the PSAP needs a client certificate
>>>  - i.e., that the mutual auth option of TLS is being used, perhaps this
>>>  needs to be clarified?
>>>
>>>
>>>   Yes, good point.  I added clarifying text in response to Ben's comments



-- 
Randall Gellens
Opinions are personal;    facts are suspect;    I speak for myself only
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