Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data

Magnus Nyström <magnusn@gmail.com> Wed, 16 September 2015 17:31 UTC

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Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 10:31:39 -0700
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From: Magnus Nyström <magnusn@gmail.com>
To: Randall Gellens <randy@qti.qualcomm.com>
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Cc: "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data
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Just a personal remark: BCP 195 still allows earlier versions of TLS, even
TLS 1.0. I felt that for a new application like this, one could go
stronger. Maybe  a combo - where you rely on BCP 195 but mandate TLS 1.2
(or later)?

On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 9:14 AM, Randall Gellens <randy@qti.qualcomm.com>
wrote:

> At 7:38 AM +0000 9/16/15, stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie wrote:
>
>  On Wed Sep 16 04:09:03 2015 GMT+0100, Magnus Nyström wrote:
>>
>>>  Yes, at least mandating TLS 1.2 or higher and recommending as per above
>>>  seems reasonable.
>>>  The references for the GCM suites would be RFC 5288 and RFC 5289.
>>>
>>
>>  BCP195 has recent recommendations for most TLS options. I'd say it'd be
>> best to use those or if not figure out why they're not correct for this
>> context.
>>
>
> Just to be clear: are you suggesting that we replace text suggested by
> Magnus:
>
>    TLS MUST be version 1.2 or later.  It is RECOMMENDED to use only
>    cypher suites that offer Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and avoid
>    Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), for example,
>    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
>    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
>    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
>    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
>    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
>    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 [RFC5288] [RFC5289].
>
> With this:
>
>    TLS MUST be version 1.2 or later.  It is RECOMMENDED follow
>    [BCP195].
>
>
> Note that BCP 195 does not address CBC (but does discuss PFS).  I just
> want to be clear before making the change, so please confirm that this
> works.
>
> --
> Randall Gellens
> Opinions are personal;    facts are suspect;    I speak for myself only
> -------------- Randomly selected tag: ---------------
> If the odds are a million to one against something occurring, chances
> are 50-50 it will.
>



-- 
-- Magnus