[secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data

Magnus Nyström <magnusn@gmail.com> Tue, 01 September 2015 04:27 UTC

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Subject: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ecrit-additional-data
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

This memo provides fundamental data structure definitions and procedural
rules for providing auxiliary information to public service answering
points (PSAPs) when emergency calls are being made.

This reads as an important memo and has been at least five years in the
making. I don't find the Security (and Privacy) Considerations section
lacking per se, but do have these questions:

- Why require HTTPS for the reference case but not the value case (I can
understand why you don't require it for the value case, but couldn't it be
a choice for the PSAP also in the reference case? This would also seem to
simplify during an introductory phase when a wide-spread PKI solution is
not yet in place.)?
- When HTTPS is required, I assume the PSAP needs a client certificate -
i.e., that the mutual auth option of TLS is being used, perhaps this needs
to be clarified?
- Was there any discussion around any MTI TLS cipher suites?
- I assume there's not only a privacy issue but also a potential spoofing
issue - the PSAPs don't want to be overly susceptible to spoofed calls
(although they rather err on the side of safety, of course. Thus, should
integrity of infomation in the direct case be considered? I.e., by n/w or
service providers in the path to the PSAP vouching for the information?

-- Magnus