Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bis-02
Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Thu, 16 July 2009 11:24 UTC
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Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2009 12:18:24 +0100
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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To: "Polk, William T." <william.polk@nist.gov>
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Cc: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "Hollenbeck, Scott" <shollenbeck@verisign.com>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bis-02
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Hi Tim, Polk, William T. wrote: > I’m a little late to the party, but I have been quietly mulling over > this problem as well. Now that Sandy has explicitly asked for an AD to > step in, I figured I should participate more actively. I have also > added Nico Williams to the CC list (my apologies, Nico) since channel > bindings is really his area of expertise. > > I think there is a real need for channel bindings with some > applications of EPP, but may not always be strictly necessary in other > cases. For example, the e-Automation project for the administration of > DNS root zone uses EPP but if I recall correctly most of the objects > that are transferred are digitally signed objects. In this case, > channel bindings are perhaps less important since we aren’t relying > solely on the EPP authentication mechanism. So, in my opinion we > should encourage their use but should not require channel bindings. > > However, if the application is relying on EPP in combination with > transport for security, channel bindings would provide significantly > enhanced security. That says channel bindings deserves to be mentioned > and a little guidance on (1) implementing channel bindings and (2) > determining when channel bindings is required. That begs a new > question of course – where does this information go? Nico's response confirmed what I was thinking about this myself: for EPP running over TLS over TCP (4934bis), channel bindings are not required, because TLS authentication is mandatory and because TLS server certificate verification procedure is also mandatory. So I don't think there is an issue with 4934bis document. > I am starting to believe that the security considerations section of > 4930bis should note that enhanced security SHOULD be achieved through > channel bindings unless the application involves digitally signed objects, I think another alternative can be to require mutual TLS authentication in a transport protocol mapping document. > and that the TLS usage section of 4934bis (section 9) should include a > pointer to techniques for implementing channel bindings with TLS. As per my coment above, I don't think this is needed. Besides adding channel bindings to EPP would require an extension to EPP itself. > I am still mulling this over, and will probably not enter any discuss > until tomorrow, but this seems the best approach. (Hopefully Nico will > weigh in before then and keep me straight on this one...)
- [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bis-02 Catherine Meadows
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Hollenbeck, Scott
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Catherine Meadows
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Hollenbeck, Scott
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Sandra Murphy
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Polk, William T.
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Hollenbeck, Scott
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Polk, William T.
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Polk, William T.
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Sandra Murphy
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Hollenbeck, Scott
- Re: [secdir] review of draft-hollenbeck-rfc4933bi… Nicolas Williams