Re: [Secdispatch] EDHOC Summary

["Martin Thomson" <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Apr 9, 2019, at 21:57, Göran Selander wrote:
> [GS] There seems to be consensus on the summary provided by the 
> Security ADs, which includes the problem statement.

The entire point of my mail was to contest that point.
 
> [GS] There is no competing solution to the problem statement. As been 
> witnessed, people have waited for years for this to progress. Therefore 
> I don't see anything premature with assuming EDHOC to be a starting 
> point for the WG. 

So you would prefer to disregard the work done by Eric and Jim completely?
 
> [GS] Concrete targets with numbers have been presented, for example here:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/vNR7nT20fsvYjYXhAPjOpLjZGCU

Presented, yes.  Agreed, no.

> [GS] A lightweight AKE on application layer, which this specific WG is 
> proposed to work on, is actually a missing enabler for constrained 
> nodes to  "communicate among themselves and with the wider Internet". 
> Indeed, if the security protocol is too heavy or needs to terminate in 
> a gateway due to change of transport etc., then end-to-end secure 
> communication between the endpoints will not take place, thus 
> preventing "to partake in permissionless innovation".  

I think that you missed my point.  If the goal is to provide an AKE, then any AKE will do.  If the goal is to communicate with other Internet nodes, then you might argue that any AKE will do, but you at least have to consider what existing Internet nodes do in making that call.