Re: [stir] Permitted spoofing

For the problems we're aiming at (robocalling, vishing and swatting), they are 100% spoofed from the start.  MITM is a potential problem, which would be desirable to cut off, but it's not the stated problem we're trying to solve.

There may be some number of service providers in the path that are tolerant of the problem, but not really complicit.   The goal is to make them be intolerant of their customers not providing verifiable identity.

Brian

On Jun 11, 2013, at 2:12 AM, Michael Hammer <michael.hammer@yaanatech.com> wrote:

> If you stop it at the start, wouldn't that solve some fraction of the
> problem?
> 
> Do we know how many calls are spoofed from the start versus from
> redirections?
> 
> Mike
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hadriel Kaplan [mailto:hadriel.kaplan@oracle.com] 
> Sent: Saturday, June 08, 2013 10:03 PM
> To: Michael Hammer
> Cc: hgs@cs.columbia.edu; Brian.Rosen@neustar.biz; stir@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [stir] Permitted spoofing
> 
> 
> I think the hope was to proactively prevent a bogus call from succeeding, as
> opposed to reactively hunting down the perpetrators after it happened.  The
> latter case should be possible now, since CDRs record enough to backtrack to
> the upstream provider, and that provider's CDRs can find its upstream
> provider, etc.
> 
> -hadriel
> 
> 
> On Jun 8, 2013, at 2:30 PM, Michael Hammer <michael.hammer@yaanatech.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> Question:  Do we really care how many redirections occurred in the 
>> middle network hops if we know what the original source of the signaling
> was?
>> 
>> Put another way, if we have a legitimate scape-goat for a problem 
>> call, do you need to catch all the stooges all at once?
>> 
>> Mike
>> 
> 
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