Re: [stir] Permitted spoofing

[Michael Hammer <[e-mail]>]

But, I'll note having following the thread, that the issue seems to devolve
to 
who wants to assert the presented caller ID value, sign it and 
be ultimately responsible for the prior chain of events.

Mike

p.s.  I see a re-hash of prior history of various existing headers, but
wondering 
if using what didn't work before amounts to hitting ones head against a wall
and wondering why it hurts?
I'm not against trying to get existing to work, but don't necessarily want
to repeat history.


-----Original Message-----
From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of
Michael Hammer
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2013 9:13 AM
To: [e-mail]
Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [stir] Permitted spoofing

If you stop it at the start, wouldn't that solve some fraction of the
problem?

Do we know how many calls are spoofed from the start versus from
redirections?

Mike


-----Original Message-----
From: Hadriel Kaplan [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Saturday, June 08, 2013 10:03 PM
To: Michael Hammer
Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [stir] Permitted spoofing


I think the hope was to proactively prevent a bogus call from succeeding, as
opposed to reactively hunting down the perpetrators after it happened.  The
latter case should be possible now, since CDRs record enough to backtrack to
the upstream provider, and that provider's CDRs can find its upstream
provider, etc.

-hadriel


On Jun 8, 2013, at 2:30 PM, Michael Hammer <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> Question:  Do we really care how many redirections occurred in the 
> middle network hops if we know what the original source of the signaling
was?
> 
> Put another way, if we have a legitimate scape-goat for a problem 
> call, do you need to catch all the stooges all at once?
> 
> Mike
>