Re: [stir] WGLC: draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-09

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Fri, 29 April 2022 21:45 UTC

Return-Path: <ben@nostrum.com>
X-Original-To: stir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: stir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B53EFC159521 for <stir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 29 Apr 2022 14:45:09 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.078
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.078 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, T_SPF_HELO_PERMERROR=0.01, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nostrum.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aO8tfcAIHgeO for <stir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 29 Apr 2022 14:45:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from nostrum.com (raven-v6.nostrum.com [IPv6:2001:470:d:1130::1]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A157EC1594A8 for <stir@ietf.org>; Fri, 29 Apr 2022 14:45:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpclient.apple (mta-70-120-133-87.satx.rr.com [70.120.133.87] (may be forged)) (authenticated bits=0) by nostrum.com (8.17.1/8.16.1) with ESMTPSA id 23TLj2eG052986 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NO); Fri, 29 Apr 2022 16:45:04 -0500 (CDT) (envelope-from ben@nostrum.com)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=nostrum.com; s=default; t=1651268704; bh=D1euISe+MJ5PlMS7KWJo9idAB7YxmS2I6BljFAuM8Lc=; h=From:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:Cc:To:References; b=Q8ufqZ//5JF6Ax3N2m5BV5e3hgFLYWuKNycN/KBmc2GJORHSVgmavXad1Ru4yfIeq qqV3hhhmK/7Fubm8bdZR4HT38QqDfKy05k4Q+D0Q2xEwhEMAngIILBCEYmFn0iB10A 1MtLRmD4u2FVhorme2N8C5mDrlb4iOpncfXt0Eg0=
X-Authentication-Warning: raven.nostrum.com: Host mta-70-120-133-87.satx.rr.com [70.120.133.87] (may be forged) claimed to be smtpclient.apple
From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
Message-Id: <6B54979F-CFFF-4634-9B06-F0F52AE69F76@nostrum.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_C118DAF0-298B-43F0-B5EC-1C06C14EC4E0"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 16.0 \(3696.80.82.1.1\))
Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 16:44:57 -0500
In-Reply-To: <6981C79A-4024-4291-B2BB-A969EF8FD930@vigilsec.com>
Cc: IETF STIR Mail List <stir@ietf.org>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
References: <5393b70d-bfc7-c8ac-eb8d-30c8087a1e89@nostrum.com> <6981C79A-4024-4291-B2BB-A969EF8FD930@vigilsec.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3696.80.82.1.1)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/stir/KW-x3JC6B-Un7vC4p98TyvURS_Q>
Subject: Re: [stir] WGLC: draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-09
X-BeenThere: stir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34
Precedence: list
List-Id: Secure Telephone Identity Revisited <stir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/stir>, <mailto:stir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/stir/>
List-Post: <mailto:stir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:stir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/stir>, <mailto:stir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 21:45:09 -0000

Hi,

I think version 17 is in pretty good shape, and I think we’ve handled the “hard” problems. I have some mostly minor comments There are a few that I probably should have noticed on previous versions. Hopefully they don’t fall too far outside of Russ’s guidance for feedback, and in any case I don’t think they are showstoppers:

Substantive:

§3, 2nd paragraph: This should probably mention “icn” in the first category, since it is separate from jCard data.

§6.1.2: “Even though this is probably not the typical case, an "rcdi" JSON pointer or integrity digest is optional if the image value is directly included via a data URI.”

Apologies, I should have caught this one in an earlier version. But wouldn’t a data: URL typically point to a body part that is not covered by the PASSporT signature? If so, it could be subject to tampering in route. Would that need integrity protection less than a HTTPS URL? I guess tampering would require an on-path attacker. But I am still skeptical of the exception unless the data: URL points to data covered by the PASSporT signature.

$9.3: Third example: Some of the examples shows a jcard photo and logo URIs, but no “icn” keys. Given the guidance to use “icn” for a default image, should “icn” keys be included?

§14.2, 2nd paragraph: “Similarly, the "jcd" or linked "jcl" jcard information and "crn" can be optionally, based on local policy for devices that support it, used to populate a Call-Info header field following the format of [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd].”

Should this mention “icn”?

§18 (Apologies, these are probably things I missed in previous versions:

First paragrapoh: The normative MUST seems dubious. Can we assert normative requirements to ecosystems we don’t control?

Third paragraph: “may be a recommended way “. I suggest “may be a useful way” or “is a recommended way”.

Editorial comments:

§4, 3rd paragraph: “pass-by-value or passed-by-reference;”
Inconsistent use of “pass” vs “passed”. Either is okay, but we should pick one.

§4, table, first row, 2nd column: s/RDC/RCD

§5.1.1: “If there is no string associated with a display name, the claim value MUST then be an empty string.”
Should “claim value” be “key value”?





> On Apr 25, 2022, at 2:51 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> 
> This might be the longest WG Last Call in history ....
> 
> A new version was just posted: https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-17.txt
> 
> Regarding the ongoing WG Last Call, we have two questions:
> 
> (1) Have any of the changes introduced new issues?
> 
> (2) Have all previously raised issues are resolved?
> 
> For the STIR WG Chairs,
>  Russ
> 
> 
>> On Dec 8, 2020, at 4:30 PM, Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> wrote:
>> 
>> This is a WGLC for draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-09.
>> 
>> Please send reviews to the list by the end of day 22 Dec 2020.
>> 
>> If you plan to provide a review but need more time, please let us know early.
>> 
>> See <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd/>
>> 
>> RjS
> 
> _______________________________________________
> stir mailing list
> stir@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/stir