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Re: [tcpm] feedcback on tcp-secure-05

Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar> Sat, 15 July 2006 21:05 UTC

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Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2006 16:27:00 -0300
To: Joe Touch <touch@ISI.EDU>, tcpm@ietf.org
From: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Subject: Re: [tcpm] feedcback on tcp-secure-05
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At 14:28 13/07/2006, Joe Touch wrote:

>The doc should also indicate that preventing these attacks does NOT
>prevent ICMP attacks (and cite Gont's draft in this regard); it would be
>useful for the security considerations to address whether ICMPs should
>be blocked altogether and what the impact of that would be. Without such
>blocking, it's not clear what the utility of this solution would be.

I disagree with having the security considerations section of a 
document that does not focus on ICMP to basically propose to eliminate ICMP.

There's an entire document of this very same WG dicussing the 
relationship between ICMP and TCP.

Kindest regards,

--
Fernando Gont
e-mail: fernando@gont.com.ar || fgont@acm.org
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1






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