Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was Re: Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan)

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Tue, 18 February 2014 15:30 UTC

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Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 15:29:52 +0000
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: "certificate-transparency@googlegroups.com" <certificate-transparency@googlegroups.com>
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Cc: "therightkey@ietf.org" <therightkey@ietf.org>, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, CABFPub <public@cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was Re: Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan)
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Sorry for long delay.

On 5 February 2014 16:19, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com> wrote:
> Table 1 of the plan document said both 3 SCTs and 4 SCTs for 27 months.
> Until there is clarification on which is required, 3-4 is the best
> representation of the requirement. I'm hoping Ben meant 15-27 months = 3 and
> 27 = 4, but it's not clear from the document.

Yes, that's exactly what I meant.

>
> Jeremy
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: public-bounces@cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org] On
> Behalf Of Rob Stradling
> Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2014 5:37 AM
> To: certificate-transparency@googlegroups.com
> Cc: therightkey@ietf.org; CABFPub
> Subject: [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was Re: Updated
> Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan)
>
> On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
>> Three or four proofs for a 27 month certificate is way too many.
> <snip>
>> Adding 400 bytes per certificate will make EV certificates unusable by
> entities concerned with performance.
>
> The updated CT+EV plan requires three SCTs for a (maximum length) 27-month
> EV certificate, not four.  400 bytes for three SCTs is about right though.
>
> Assuming RFC6962-compliant v1 SCTs that contain no SCT extensions and are
> signed using ECDSA and a P-256 private key, then, including all of the ASN.1
> fluff for the SCT List certificate extension, I calculate that it'll be...
>
> 140 or 141 bytes to embed 1 SCT
>
> 261 to 263 bytes to embed 2 SCTs
>
> 380 to 383 bytes to embed 3 SCTs
>
> For (non-EV) validity periods between 27 and 39 months:
> 499 to 503 bytes to embed 4 SCTs
>
> On 04/02/14 17:52, Adam Langley wrote:
> <snip>
>> We should make the SCTs as small as possible
>
> Agreed.  Time for some back-of-an-envelope sums.  For SCT v2, if we were to
> pack in the data as tightly as possible I reckon we could cut it down to as
> little as...
>
> 84 bytes to embed 1 SCT
>
> 159 bytes to embed 2 SCTs
>
> 231 bytes to embed 3 SCTs
>
> 303 bytes to embed 4 SCTs
>
> Here's how...
>
> 1. Use a shorter OID for the SCT List extension.  Perhaps CABForum could
> define 2.23.140.n (with n < 128).  Save 6 bytes.
>
> 2. The first 2 bytes of the SignedCertificateTimestampList structure are its
> total length.  Since this can be calculated from the OCTET STRING length,
> these 2 bytes could be omitted.  Save 2 bytes.
>
> 3. Pack the SCT fields into as few bytes as possible for the common case,
> whilst retaining options for future expansion.  Save 37 bytes per SCT.
> Replace...
>    (1 byte)    Version sct_version;
>    (32 bytes)  LogID id;
>    (8 bytes)   uint64 timestamp;
>    (2+? bytes) CtExtensions extensions;
> ...with...
>    (2 bits)    sct_version    (00=v1; 01=v2; 10,11=unassigned)
>    (2 bits)    log_id_type    (00=SHA-256(log_public_key);
>                                01=1-byte Registered Log ID;
>                                10=2-byte Registered Log ID;
>                                11=4-byte Registered Log ID)
>    (2 bits)    timestamp_size (00=8-bytes;
>                                01=6-bytes;
>                                10=5-bytes;
>                                11=4-bytes)
>    (1 bit)     extensions     (0=CtExtensions is present;
>                                1=CtExtensions is absent)
>    (1 bit)     signature_type (0=digitally-signed struct;
>                                1=raw Ed25519 signature)
>    For the common case:
>    (1 byte)    Registered Log ID
>    (4 bytes)   Timestamp (seconds, not milliseconds)
>
> 4. Use the Ed25519 signature scheme instead of ECDSA.  ECDSA signatures
> using a P-256 key seem to be 72 or 73 bytes, whereas Ed25519 signatures are
> 64 bytes.  Save 8 or 9 bytes per SCT.
> Also, for Ed25519, omit the 2 bytes containing the hash algorithm and
> signature algorithm from the "digitally-signed struct" header.  Save 2 bytes
> per SCT.
>
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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