Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was Re: Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan)
"Jeremy Rowley" <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com> Wed, 05 February 2014 16:19 UTC
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From: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com>
To: 'Rob Stradling' <rob.stradling@comodo.com>, certificate-transparency@googlegroups.com
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Cc: therightkey@ietf.org, 'CABFPub' <public@cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was Re: Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan)
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Table 1 of the plan document said both 3 SCTs and 4 SCTs for 27 months. Until there is clarification on which is required, 3-4 is the best representation of the requirement. I'm hoping Ben meant 15-27 months = 3 and >27 = 4, but it's not clear from the document. Jeremy -----Original Message----- From: public-bounces@cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Rob Stradling Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2014 5:37 AM To: certificate-transparency@googlegroups.com Cc: therightkey@ietf.org; CABFPub Subject: [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was Re: Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan) On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Jeremy Rowley wrote: > Three or four proofs for a 27 month certificate is way too many. <snip> > Adding 400 bytes per certificate will make EV certificates unusable by entities concerned with performance. The updated CT+EV plan requires three SCTs for a (maximum length) 27-month EV certificate, not four. 400 bytes for three SCTs is about right though. Assuming RFC6962-compliant v1 SCTs that contain no SCT extensions and are signed using ECDSA and a P-256 private key, then, including all of the ASN.1 fluff for the SCT List certificate extension, I calculate that it'll be... 140 or 141 bytes to embed 1 SCT 261 to 263 bytes to embed 2 SCTs 380 to 383 bytes to embed 3 SCTs For (non-EV) validity periods between 27 and 39 months: 499 to 503 bytes to embed 4 SCTs On 04/02/14 17:52, Adam Langley wrote: <snip> > We should make the SCTs as small as possible Agreed. Time for some back-of-an-envelope sums. For SCT v2, if we were to pack in the data as tightly as possible I reckon we could cut it down to as little as... 84 bytes to embed 1 SCT 159 bytes to embed 2 SCTs 231 bytes to embed 3 SCTs 303 bytes to embed 4 SCTs Here's how... 1. Use a shorter OID for the SCT List extension. Perhaps CABForum could define 2.23.140.n (with n < 128). Save 6 bytes. 2. The first 2 bytes of the SignedCertificateTimestampList structure are its total length. Since this can be calculated from the OCTET STRING length, these 2 bytes could be omitted. Save 2 bytes. 3. Pack the SCT fields into as few bytes as possible for the common case, whilst retaining options for future expansion. Save 37 bytes per SCT. Replace... (1 byte) Version sct_version; (32 bytes) LogID id; (8 bytes) uint64 timestamp; (2+? bytes) CtExtensions extensions; ...with... (2 bits) sct_version (00=v1; 01=v2; 10,11=unassigned) (2 bits) log_id_type (00=SHA-256(log_public_key); 01=1-byte Registered Log ID; 10=2-byte Registered Log ID; 11=4-byte Registered Log ID) (2 bits) timestamp_size (00=8-bytes; 01=6-bytes; 10=5-bytes; 11=4-bytes) (1 bit) extensions (0=CtExtensions is present; 1=CtExtensions is absent) (1 bit) signature_type (0=digitally-signed struct; 1=raw Ed25519 signature) For the common case: (1 byte) Registered Log ID (4 bytes) Timestamp (seconds, not milliseconds) 4. Use the Ed25519 signature scheme instead of ECDSA. ECDSA signatures using a P-256 key seem to be 72 or 73 bytes, whereas Ed25519 signatures are 64 bytes. Save 8 or 9 bytes per SCT. Also, for Ed25519, omit the 2 bytes containing the hash algorithm and signature algorithm from the "digitally-signed struct" header. Save 2 bytes per SCT. -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist COMODO - Creating Trust Online _______________________________________________ Public mailing list Public@cabforum.org https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
- [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparency + … Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Wayne Thayer
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Wayne Thayer
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Wayne Thayer
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Wayne Thayer
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- [therightkey] Thoughts on reducing SCT sizes (was… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] EXTERNAL: Re: [cabfpub] Updated… Mehner, Carl
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing … Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Jeremy Rowley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Carl Wallace
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Rick Andrews
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Adam Langley
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… michal.proszkiewicz
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Rick Andrews
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Chema López González
- Re: [therightkey] Updated Certificate Transparenc… Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… kirk_hall@trendmicro.com
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing … Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing … Tim Moses
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing … Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing … Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing … Ben Laurie
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Thoughts on reducing … Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… i-barreira
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Rob Stradling
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Mat Caughron
- Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate T… Mat Caughron