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Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan

Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> Tue, 04 February 2014 20:32 UTC

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From: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2014 15:31:55 -0500
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To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley@digicert.com>
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Cc: therightkey <therightkey@ietf.org>, certificate-transparency <certificate-transparency@googlegroups.com>, CABFPub <public@cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] [cabfpub] Updated Certificate Transparency + Extended Validation plan
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On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 3:24 PM, Jeremy Rowley
<jeremy.rowley@digicert.com> wrote:
> What's wrong with rendering certificates invalid?  Isn't the burden on the
> CA to ensure their customers are satisfied?  If the CA wants to take the
> risk, let them. We'll make sure our customers 100% understand the risks when
> deciding how many proofs to embed.

But the burden of an invalid certificate significantly falls on
users/browsers, not just on the site. If distrusting a log causes 1%
of the Internet to go dark, we essentially cannot do it. It's because
of these externalities that we're seeking these assurances.


Cheers

AGL

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