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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Fri, 03 July 2015 23:25 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 03 Jul 2015 19:25:04 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek
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On Friday, July 03, 2015 07:13:15 pm Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I think we probably need to have WG consensus for the SHA-1 thing.

Yes, that's why I left it out of that changeset. I don't think the topic of what to do in the TLS 1.3 spec with SHA1 has been discussed on this list. (if it has, please point me to the thread if someone can)

The simplest thing would be to have a MUST NOT offer or negotiate in 2017 or later and a NOT RECOMMENDED to use until then. Or, we could go deeper into the weeds and talk about expiration dates. Banning it totally for TLS 1.3+ is also an option, but probably not wanted yet.

Regardless of the exact details, the signatures extension needs to be mandatory, so adding an MTI extensions section (as previously discussed) first is probably a good idea. As noted earlier in this thread, this would fix the issue of SHA1 as defaults.


Dave

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