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Re: [TLS] Deprecate SHA1 for signatures in TLS 1.3 (was Re: TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 07 July 2015 16:11 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Jul 2015 09:10:15 -0700
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To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Cc: Karthikeyan Bhargavan <karthik.bhargavan@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecate SHA1 for signatures in TLS 1.3 (was Re: TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek)
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On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 8:35 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tuesday, July 07, 2015 10:57:24 am Salz, Rich wrote:
> > > Putting aside the timeline for retiring SHA-1 from certificates, which
> will
> > > happen sooner than later, I think we should ban MD5 and SHA1 from
> client
> > > and server signatures in TLS 1.3.
> >
> > Strongly in favor.  I see no reason why a new protocol should ever use
> SHA1.
>
> Good. There seems to be strong support all around for this. I've updated
> the PR to drop SHA1 too.
>
> PR:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/188/files
> Issue:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/186


This PR seems to prohibit use of SHA-1 for certificates as well, which I'm
not sure
is wise. I suggest we put this on the agenda for Prague.

-Ekr


>
> I also have a mandatory extensions patch here:
>
> https://github.com/davegarrett/tls13-spec/compare/pruning...davegarrett:mandatoryextensions
>
> I'll probably just submit a PR for that too in a bit.
>
>
> Dave
>
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