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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Fri, 03 July 2015 17:23 UTC

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 03 Jul 2015 19:23:19 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek
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On Tuesday 30 June 2015 15:23:18 Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Folks,
> 
> Yesterday, I posted the -06 draft which snapshots the consensus changes
> made since -05, specifically:
> 
> - Prohibit RC4 negotiation for backwards compatibility.
> - Freeze & deprecate record layer version field.
> - Update format of signatures with context.
> - Remove explicit IV.

I've noticed that the default values in case the client didn't use signature 
algorithms extensions is to use SHA1+RSA, SHA1+DSA and SHA1+ECDSA.

As we all know, those are not considered secure now.

Maybe we should update it to SHA256 for all three?

-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic

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