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Re: [TLS] Deprecate SHA1 for signatures in TLS 1.3 (was Re: TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek)

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 13 July 2015 22:08 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecate SHA1 for signatures in TLS 1.3 (was Re: TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek)
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On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 07:45:30PM +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:

> Would it make sense for an opportunistic client to advertise all algorithms
> commonly supported in the server certs? After all, there are relatively
> few signature/hash pairs in use, and they are changing very slowly over
> time.

This does not work when new algorithms are introduced, since you
can't advertise algorithms you don't know exist.

-- 
	Viktor.

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