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Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] (confusing the issues) Re: 3DES diediedie

Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> Mon, 29 August 2016 21:48 UTC

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From: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
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Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2016 14:48:40 -0700
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References: <CAHOTMV+r5PVxqnSozYyqJqq_YocMKV06aAa-43t+5Huzh7Lo=A@mail.gmail.com> <F42128A0-9682-4042-8C7E-E3686743B314@cisco.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4D0473F@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <B749662D-B518-46E0-A51D-4AD1D30A8ED2@cisco.com> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4D0528F@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <3401C8F7-5A74-4D02-96F5-057E9A45F8B0@cisco.com> <57C43102.7090902@secworks.se> <b1956113-b21a-f995-2e35-3011eb76ce8a@gmail.com>
To: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, "David McGrew (mcgrew)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] (confusing the issues) Re: 3DES diediedie
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> On Aug 29, 2016, at 6:26 AM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> I think it is a mistake to think that simply using block ciphers with a larger block size is enough to counter attacks, as the literature on successful side channel attacks on such block cipher demonstrates. The real message is that one should not reuse keys ad infinitum, which unfortunately seems hard to sink in.
> 
> Singling out 3-DES in this respect does not seem to tackle the real issue (which is a system security issue often only paid lip service to in practice).

Yes, we should just stop using 64-bit block ciphers and deal with the issues you mention within the context of larger blocks.

	Jon

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