Re: [TLS] OCSP must staple

[Tom Ritter <[e-mail]>]

On 8 June 2014 00:59, Yoav Nir <[e-mail]> wrote:

> dictate to whom?  Isn't the presence of this extension a mandate on the
> server operators themselves?
>

Well, yes, but in the same way that HSTS is a mandate on a server operator
to make their site available over HTTPS.  I think the mandate is more
accurately terms as for the client.  If a staple is not provided, you
should reject the certificate as invalid.


> And enforced how?  Suppose a server sends the client a certificate with
> the extension, and does not staple an OCSP response, are clients going to
> cut the connection or are they going to try the OCSP server. And if they
> try the OCSP server, is ti going to reject them?
>

While it looks some of the semantics of 'Must Staple', I think either
behavior could be acceptable for a client.  Either closing the connection
without attempting to contact a OCSP server, or switching to a 'Hard Fail'
OCSP lookup.

I can imagine some servers deciding that they would want clients to fail if
they didn't send a staple, rather than leak the OCSP lookup to the CA.  I
could imagine other servers wanting to hedge their bets and have the client
make an attempt before giving up.

I don't understand what you mean by the OCSP server rejcting them.


> I'm trying to get my head around how this extension is going to be
> deployed.
>

I see it as a server opting in to strict revocation checking for a
certificate.  (Later on, for the host itself, but for now, just the
certificate.)

-tom