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Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection

"Kyle Hamilton" <aerowolf@gmail.com> Tue, 19 December 2006 22:42 UTC

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Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2006 15:41:57 -0700
From: Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
To: martin.rex@sap.com
Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection
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On every renegotiation, does the server have to reauthenticate itself
(present its certificate again)?  Or can the credential on the client
side be cached to avoid that duplication?

-Kyle H

On 12/19/06, Martin Rex <martin.rex@sap.com> wrote:
> Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> > Good point.
> >
> > However, as you say in most cases the request for client auth
> > is contingent upon seeing the request and so a rehandshake is
> > required here in any case. A one-pass protocol wouldn't work
> > here.
>
> Correct.
>
> I had the same thought but completely failed to point this out.
>
> In the not uncommon case with IIS renegotiating after having
> evaluated the HTTP(S)-request, the one-pass protocol can not
> be used.
>
> -Martin
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@lists.ietf.org
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>


-- 

-Kyle H

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