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RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection

<Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com> Wed, 20 December 2006 10:50 UTC

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Subject: RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2006 12:49:13 +0200
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I agree with many of Eric's comments.

TLS can already hide the client certificates, but this mechanism 
is not widely used. This draft proposes an optimization to the 
hiding mechanism that requires a smaller number of roundtrips and 
less computation. 

However, it seems that the reasons why the existing feature is
not used have nothing to do with poor performance. And if the
existing mechanism doesn't have a performance problem, optimizing
it would be premature (and thus "root of all evil" :-).

Best regards,
Pasi

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