RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection

Netscape and Microsoft always took different approaches to https, and TLS. You can, too! For Netscape, 
they really never moved beyond writing a common client-side library, that smelled like a socket,
but got managed like any winform or adminwebsite. The lib was always used to secure-enable an 
app [platform], versus be a protocol layer. And this was despite their excellent stack-architecture (as 
the patent shows!); and the MSFT-produced implementation of the platform even in winsock! For Microsoft,
they contrasted Netscape's "application-centric platform making" by putting SSL and SSL CSPs
into the OS platform, so it could be properly evaluated under CC like all the rest of the B1-grade OS
security features that Windows NT was approaching at that point. For Netscape, FIPS-mode
was really as far as they got with assurance doctrine; for Microsoft (MSFT UK in particular, and the UK 
eval labs), meeting assurance standards, architecturally and functionally, was the whole game. Evaluating the 
network component of a trusted commodity OS was not hard science, at that point. There was 
a enormous amount work done in this area, for NT 4.0, and then again for NT4 SP4.
This is all junk Internet history. But, SSL has always been a very varied camp, as you would expect
from something capable of being an Internet Standard. It has a momentum of its own,
because of something architecturally "right". Kipp H (who I never met) and Tajer did something 
very special. It would not have made it to SSL3 without the Wienstiens, and their hypermedia orientation. 
Tim D and co, with SSLRef and those early VeriSign security audits! and the 2 nameless Australian breathren, of 
course! And, lets not forget the other Eric! Eric R.'s work with Alan Schiffman for DARPA
were all part of the early argument that became the mainstay of NS vs MSFT, choosing between 
application vs OS/stack solutions for SPs. I still remember the first time I ever heard of 
SSL...in Eric's/Alan's lecture, launching shttp version dot-something, by compare and contrast! I dont
recall if this was late 94, or 95; though it would not be hard to find out, given the "searchable record 
system" known as the Internet.

This all seemed bizzare to the world I was looking at, which was all about repurposing NSA's TLSP , fathoming 
ongoing NLSP standards in ISOland, and figuring what all the legacy "weird" key management
protocol stuff from the Motorola/BBN/GTE security groups was all about, and its (then) weird access 
control concept, via key management!

And none of that would have mattered if the MSFT team (which I knew very well) had not
been competing at the architectural level: on the the grounds of "platform-to-platform," 
"belief system" to "belief system" about what grandma really needs from a PC.
IETF gave the standard the wrong name. As that benchmark of security argument, known as 
David Kemp, once  erred: the "Session Layer Socket" protocol does X....

> To get widespread deployment, several TLS implementations would > have to be updated, e.g. Microsoft Schannel, OpenSSL, Mozilla NSS, > JSSE, GnuTLS, etc. Getting any change, no matter how "minimal", > to them is not easy.> > > > I think deployment-wise, double handshake has the advantage > > > that it's already specified and implemented.> > > > Any link to test the implementation, please?> > Pick your favorite TLS implementation! There are at least> couple of dozen of them (though probably not all of them> support renegotiation). > > Some of my favourites (which seem to support renegotiation)> are http://www.openssl.org/ and http://www.gnutls.org/ -- but no > doubt there are other ones that are equally good.> > Best regards,> Pasi> > _______________________________________________> TLS mailing list> TLS@lists.ietf.org> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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