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Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection

Badra <mbadra@gmail.com> Wed, 20 December 2006 17:43 UTC

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Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2006 18:43:33 +0100
From: Badra <mbadra@gmail.com>
To: martin.rex@sap.com
Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection
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On 12/20/06, Martin Rex <martin.rex@sap.com> wrote:

> badra wrote:
> >
> > > To get widespread deployment, several TLS implementations would
> > > have to be updated, e.g. Microsoft Schannel, OpenSSL, Mozilla NSS,
> > > JSSE, GnuTLS, etc. Getting any change, no matter how "minimal",
> > > to them is not easy.
> > >
> >
> > I don't see the point here. Any TLS feature will require updating TLS
> > implementations.
>
> The point is, that by using renegotiation (=double handshake)
> to protect the client identity, no code changes are necessary,
> this should already work with most of the installed base,
> even with many/most pure SSLv3 client implementations.





I think we can stop argumanting on the (to be extended) code :)


Best regards,
Badra

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