Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection
Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> Tue, 19 December 2006 21:04 UTC
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To: martin.rex@sap.com
Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection
References: <200612192100.WAA22456@uw1048.wdf.sap.corp>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2006 13:04:07 -0800
In-Reply-To: <200612192100.WAA22456@uw1048.wdf.sap.corp> (Martin Rex's message of "Tue, 19 Dec 2006 22:00:29 +0100 (MET)")
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Martin Rex <martin.rex@sap.com> writes: > Eric Rescorla wrote: >> >> The good news is that TLS has a very simple mechanism for achieving >> this: do an ordinary TLS handshake without client authentication >> and then do an immediate re-handshake with client auth. As the >> authors observe, this is slower (two sets of crypto computations >> and 4 RTTs) than a specialized identity protection mode. However, >> it is available now and as far as I can tell is rarely done. >> I don't find the argument that there is a large demand for this >> feature if it were only 50% faster particularly persuasive. >> Rather, this seems like a premature optimization. > > It is not as rare as you might think. It is actually the > default in Microsoft's IIS with some configurations that > IIS only requests SSL client authentication after > having seen the request (URL). It might be a side-effect > of NOT requiring SSL client authentication on the root/home > page of the webserver and only for certain areas/paths. Good point. However, as you say in most cases the request for client auth is contingent upon seeing the request and so a rehandshake is required here in any case. A one-pass protocol wouldn't work here. -Ekr _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Kyle Hamilton
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Peter Williams
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Eric Rescorla
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Peter Williams
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Peter Williams
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Eric Rescorla
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Peter Williams
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection badra
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Badra
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Omirjan Batyrbaev
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection home_pw
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection home_pw
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection EKR
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection home_pw
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection home_pw
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Martin Rex
- RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Peter Williams
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection EKR
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection home_pw
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection EKR
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection home_pw
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection EKR
- Re: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection home_pw