Re: [TLS] EU cards

Peter Gutmann <> Fri, 29 July 2011 06:17 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <>
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Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2011 18:17:28 +1200
Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
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Anders Rundgren <> writes:

>Dropping HTTPS CCA, it will never leave the 0.1% slot anyway so why would the 
>browser vendor bother about how it works?
>Now to the cards: Since
>1. readers is a non-standard item
>2. all cards need different middleware
>3. cannot be fitted with additional certificates
>4. is generally only trusted by a restricted group
>5. commercial CAs require certified RP SW, contracts this is simply put 
>entirely uninteresting

You forgot 2a:

2a. The middleware is buggy, unstable, only works on certain system 
configurations or on certain hardware, prevents or upsets normal operation of 
the system it's installed on, etc.  Vendors mostly ignore bug reports, and 
aren't interested in updating their drivers unless you go back and buy another 
half-million cards.

>The government cards are status projects.  We have issued x millions cards.  

I tend to refer to them as "government charities", but that's more or less the 
same thing.