Re: [TLS] EU cards
Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> Thu, 28 July 2011 19:10 UTC
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Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2011 21:10:00 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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To: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>
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Cc: "S.tefan Winter" <stefan.winter@restena.lu>, Martin Gaedke <martin.gaedke@informatik.tu-chemnitz.de>, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
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Dropping HTTPS CCA, it will never leave the 0.1% slot anyway so why would the browser vendor bother about how it works? Now to the cards: Since 1. readers is a non-standard item 2. all cards need different middleware 3. cannot be fitted with additional certificates 4. is generally only trusted by a restricted group 5. commercial CAs require certified RP SW, contracts this is simply put entirely uninteresting The government cards are status projects. We have issued x millions cards. That they are only used as physical ID-cards is something they are slightly less open about... Banks in Scandinavia put eID on credit-cards which means that every merchant get your SSN as well (if they want). As I say all the time: Google and Apple will make all EU cards look like they always was: A pile of s--t. Anders On 2011-07-28 17:07, Henry Story wrote: > Hi Peter, > > You may want to ask Prof. Martin Gaedke about this. He is working his way through the > EU area on this and should have some good pointers on where these token cards are > going around here. > > Henry > > On 28 Jul 2011, at 16:45, Peter Gutmann wrote: > >> Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu> writes: >> >>> Banking: These days, TAN lists are going away. >> >> Is there any information on what's being done in countries like France, Italy, >> the Netherlands, Spain, ...? The only place where it's really documented (in >> quite some detail) is Germany (with surrounding/similar countries like Austria >> and Switzerland using equivalent approaches), but what are other countries in >> Europe doing? There's rather little information *from third parties, not the >> vendors* publicly available on how e-banking is done in France, Spain, ..., >> the pros and cons, how it deals with new attack types, and so on. >> >>> a) cell phone transaction numbers: >> >> The problem is that mTANs are vulnerable to smartphone malware, as Zeus has >> already shown. It's currently a minor threat, but who knows how far the bad >> guys will take it. On the whole though mTANs are a nice tradeoff, you get to >> verify the transaction over an independent channel, and the mTAN is a >> cryptographic hash over the transaction data so if a MITB tries to modify what >> the browser sends it gets detected. >> >> Peter. >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > Social Web Architect > http://bblfish.net/ > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
- [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication in … Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Paul Wouters
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Matt McCutchen
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Stefan Winter
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Wan-Teh Chang
- Re: [TLS] EU cards Henry Story
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… t.petch
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication… Martin Rex