Re: [TLS] EU cards

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <> Thu, 28 July 2011 19:42 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <>
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Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2011 15:42:15 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] EU cards
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Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
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Where is your data on government cards usage coming from? 

In US a lot (literally millions) of government email and Web access is secured by what you call "government cards". 


----- Original Message -----
From: Anders Rundgren []
Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2011 03:10 PM
To: Henry Story <>
Cc: S.tefan Winter <>lu>; Martin Gaedke <>de>; <>
Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards

Dropping HTTPS CCA, it will never leave the 0.1% slot anyway so
why would the browser vendor bother about how it works?

Now to the cards: Since
1. readers is a non-standard item
2. all cards need different middleware
3. cannot be fitted with additional certificates
4. is generally only trusted by a restricted group
5. commercial CAs require certified RP SW, contracts
this is simply put entirely uninteresting

The government cards are status projects.  We have issued
x millions cards.  That they are only used as physical ID-cards
is something they are slightly less open about...

Banks in Scandinavia put eID on credit-cards which means that
every merchant get your SSN as well (if they want).

As I say all the time: Google and Apple will make all EU cards look
like they always was: A pile of s--t.


On 2011-07-28 17:07, Henry Story wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>  You may want to ask Prof. Martin Gaedke about this. He is working his way through the 
> EU area on this and should have some good pointers on where these token cards are 
> going around here. 
>    Henry
> On 28 Jul 2011, at 16:45, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> Stefan Winter <> writes:
>>> Banking: These days, TAN lists are going away.
>> Is there any information on what's being done in countries like France, Italy,
>> the Netherlands, Spain, ...?  The only place where it's really documented (in
>> quite some detail) is Germany (with surrounding/similar countries like Austria
>> and Switzerland using equivalent approaches), but what are other countries in
>> Europe doing?  There's rather little information *from third parties, not the
>> vendors* publicly available on how e-banking is done in France, Spain, ...,
>> the pros and cons, how it deals with new attack types, and so on.
>>> a) cell phone transaction numbers:
>> The problem is that mTANs are vulnerable to smartphone malware, as Zeus has
>> already shown.  It's currently a minor threat, but who knows how far the bad
>> guys will take it.  On the whole though mTANs are a nice tradeoff, you get to
>> verify the transaction over an independent channel, and the mTAN is a
>> cryptographic hash over the transaction data so if a MITB tries to modify what
>> the browser sends it gets detected.
>> Peter.
>> _______________________________________________
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